nadine yacht recovery

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How Jordan Belfort's 37m superyacht Nadine sank off the coast of Sardinia

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kc135delta Member

I saw this m/y on another thread here and it peaked my curiosity. Very narrow beam, apparently extended a couple times and then it sank off the coast of france. Does anyone know where she was built? Specs? Engines? Any sister ships? And why did she sink?

Norseman Senior Member

And why did she sink? Click to expand...

captholli Senior Member

Built in Holland in one of the founding federation of ship builders that finally became the modern day two Feadship yards of Van Lent and DeVries. Believe she was launched as CoCo Chanel (not sure) than named Jan Pamela and "Jumbolized" or a mid section of 30' fabricated @ Merrill Stevens and installed in 1982. Sank while making passage from Naples to Sardinia as the loss has been well documented.

NYCAP123 Senior Member

Back at the time of her sinking I'd heard that a forward hatch blew open in rough seas and it was a done deal from there. They tried to jettison the toys to regain stability, but it was too little, too late.

K1W1 Senior Member

Hi, The Skipper of it when it sank is a well known and active character within the industry to this very day. I found this on another site. Nadine's sinking was indeed caused by the violent waves. A foredeck hatch was smashed, allowing water to flood the crew quarters and bringing the yacht down by the bow. This allowed more waves to break over the fordeck and they caused one of the large tenders carried there to shift, breaking one of the dining salon windows that overlooked the foredeck, which causing flooding on the maindeck. As if that wasn't bad enough, the violent motion of the yacht caused the swim platform to rip off the hull, allowing the lazarette to flood.

Ahh, now its coming back to me, The first lengthening was the 12' cockpit addition @ Merrill Stevens in 1980 the original machinery in place when launched was Detroit Diesel 12-71 naturals for mains and 6-71 gens. Mains replaced in 1991 with Cat 3412 and Gens replaced with N.L. -This work was also done by Merrill Stevens in Miami.

captholli said: Mains replaced in 1991 with Cat 3412 and Gens replaced with N.L. -This work was also done by Merrill Stevens in Miami. Click to expand...

C4ENG Senior Member

But then not to long after the Nadine sinking, Mr. Little hired that Capt to run Starship. Proved to be a good idea because that captain did an excellent job marketing the vessel for charter. I then felt fortunate enough to be there when Mr. Little did has last boat ride before departing for the big boat in the sky. We went to Freeport Bahamas Port Luycaya. The unique thing was, on that trip I never seen him happier.

Hi, Uncle Bernie as we used to call him was an outstanding Owner and one heck of a gentleman to work for or be associated with.

I was the Engineer from '80 to '84 when Mel Powers out of Dallas owned her as Jan Pamela and Norm Dahl was Capt. So I have first hand knowledge of what, when and where the cockpit and and mid section were added right down to a young Kiwi, Paul Solenicks contracted to provide the electrical work through his newly formed Co. Tess Marine. After Mel filed chapter 13 the boat went up for auction and the Whole crew went on to Empress Subaru.

nas130 Member

The autobiography "The Wolf of Wall Street" and "Catching the Wolf of Wall Street" both have some information about the sinking of the Nadine. The movie "Boiler Room" was allegedly the story of Nadines owner’s business on Long Island. I think the book about megayacht disasters also has some interviews with the captain and crew that were taken after sinking.

Hi, Captholli- Would your first name be Mark by any chance?

No, But enjoying the anonymity as you do "Kiwi" Cheers!

Hi, I asked because in 1984 I met a guy who was Chief on Empress Subaru and I thought his name was Mark Hollingsworth. He also got speared in the foot with a dart at a party I was at. By the way Paul Salenieks expanded his co - Tess Electrical Marine and sold it out to a multi national.

Neil Rooney Senior Member

Seawind with Allison C-18 I have been a passenger in that Seawind a few times. She was powered by an Allison C-18 Turbine with a cut down 3 blade prop. Quite a fast plane. The plane was in the USA when Nadine went down. Do read the account in "The Wolf OF Wall Street".

Benprez New Member

this boat was once owned by Jordan Belfort the wolf of wall street it sunk watch the youtube story jordan belfort yacht story

Hi, It had a few more interesting Owners as well. The late great Bernie Little and the infamous Mel Powers to name just two.

CaptTom Senior Member

Benprez said: ↑ this boat was once owned by Jordan Belfort the wolf of wall street it sunk watch the youtube story jordan belfort yacht story Click to expand...

stgeorge123 New Member

MY Nadine With the new movie 'The Wolf of Wall Strret' about to come out, I relooked at this thread and discovered it has never been clearly answered. The 'Nadine' was originally built at Niklaas Vitsen und vis in Aalkmar Holland circa 1962 for a wealthy French industrialist - she was floated as 'Mathilda' and retained this name until May 1977 when she was renamed Coco Chanel and crossed over to the US. She was originally fitted with GM Diesels and Mercedes gensets.The next time she was over in the Med, if my memory serves me right was in 1988 at the Cannes Film Festival, on charter having come across on Dock Express. Jordan Belfort was onboard with guests and full crew when she sadly sank off Corsica (all rescued fortunately) - theories and way she sank are numerous and probably mostly inaccurate, but I believe her length, by now 53 metres instead of the 40 metres she was originally built at, contributed. However, having sailed on this vessel as Ch.Off from 1970 - 1977, she should never have set sail in the weather conditions that day, which eventually were worse than forecast - whatever the Owner said!!

Hi, Mel Powers owned it when it was stretched by Merril Stevens in Miami. It lurked around the area for a few years and the late Bernie Little expressed an interest in it when it was called Jan or Jam Pamela and was laying at Merril Stevens in 1988. I was working for BLL on something else and was asked to go take a look. I next saw it when I was in Astilleros in Palma in the summer of 1989. Follwing this it was acquired by BLL and I worked on the refit when it was repowered with CAT 3412's and CAT Gensets in late 1992. The rest as they say is history - there are varying accounts of many historical events so this fits well.

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The Ridiculous True Story Behind Wolf Of Wall Street’s Yacht

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The Real Story Behind the Yacht in The Wolf of Wall Street

Based on the eponymous memoir, the 2013 hit The Wolf of Wall Street told the story of Jordan Belfort, a former stockbroker who was convicted of securities fraud and money laundering. Directed by Martin Scorsese and starring Leonardo DiCaprio, the movie was a smashing success through and through. Amongst its many impressionable scenes, one of the most memorable ones was the yacht party, where Belfort and his colleagues indulged in lavish excess. However, Belfort’s ex-wife, Nadine Caridi, has now spoken out about the real story behind the yacht.

Nadine Caridi, the Ex-Wife

Caridi, who was portrayed in the movie by Margot Robbie, gave an interview in which she revealed that the yacht scene was not entirely accurate. According to Caridi, the yacht that was shown in the movie was not the one that Belfort actually owned. Instead, it was rented for the filming of the scene. In reality, Belfort owned a different yacht called Nadine. Caridi claims that the yacht was named after her and that she played a significant role in its design and decoration. She says that the yacht was much smaller than the one shown in the movie, but it was still luxurious and served as a symbol of Belfort’s wealth.

The Sinking of the Nadine Yacht

Nadine Caridi recently spoke about the sinking of the yacht in June 1996, an event that inspired a scene in the movie. The yacht’s sinking during a storm off the coast of Italy was a terrifying experience for everyone on board. The waves were violent and relentless, hitting the yacht repeatedly. Rescue services had to be called in to rescue the passengers and crew, including Belfort and Caridi. In a recent TikTok video, Caridi shared real-life footage of the rescue, showing the fear and chaos that ensued during the storm, while expressing gratitude that everyone survived.

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The Salt Trap

Back in 2017, artist James Bridle demonstrated how an understanding of road markings using salt could paralyze a self-driving car midway by delivering confusing messages. You need to draw two circles of salt, one in a block line and the other in broken stripes. When the car comes to the middle of it, the markings will direct it to go right ahead and also not to cross, simultaneously. The result is the fabulous “Autonomous Trap 001.” Future models may be able to overcome this fun technological quirk, but it has surely raised a valid question about the possibility of the success of the trick. It’s astonishing to find out that there may be a simple way to manipulate the environment to disrupt the self-driving capacity of an autonomous car.

The Response

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Marine Investigation Report M90L3034

Sinking of the Fishing Vessel "NADINE" Gulf of St. Lawrence 16 December 1990

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigated this occurrence for the purpose of advancing transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability. This report is not created for use in the context of legal, disciplinary or other proceedings. See Ownership and use of content .

Download this investigation report in PDF
See other information related to this investigation
Factual information
Safety action

On 16 December 1990, while returning in heavy weather from fishing grounds in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the "NADINE", a 37-metre fishing vessel, listed to port and sank by the stern. A search and rescue operation was immediately undertaken to locate the ten people aboard. Two crew members were rescued and the bodies of six victims were recovered. Two crew members are still missing.

The Board determined that the "NADINE" sank because the openings on the afterdeck and in the transverse bulkheads were not secured. Water was thus able to enter the vessel and eventually flood the lazaret, the fish holds and the engine-room. This ingress gradually reduced the vessel's stability until all reserve buoyancy was lost and the vessel sank. Poor weather, darkness, lack of training and the suddenness of the sinking hindered the abandonment and contributed to the loss of life.

1.0 Factual Information

1.1 particulars of the vessel, 1.1.1 background of the "nadine".

Although built as a trawler, the "NADINE" was converted into a seiner during her middle years and then reconverted to a trawler in the latter part of her working life. During the final reconversion, the vessel's original design appears to have been faithfully reproduced except for the placement of the trawl warp winches, which were relocated forward of the fish hold hatches (see Appendix A).

1.2 History of the voyage

The "NADINE" left Cap-aux-Meules, Quebec, for fishing grounds 30 nautical miles (M) off Cape St. George, Newfoundland, at about 0830 Footnote 3 on 12 December. She carried a crew of nine and a marine biologist from Fisheries and Oceans Canada (F&O). She reached the 4Rd and 4Ss fishing grounds in Fishing Zone 1 (see Appendix B) approximately nine and a half hours later and commenced fishing.

The following day, the vessel put into St. George's Bay to shelter from strong south-easterly winds. At about 1900 that day, she sailed for Stephenville where she spent 14 December repairing fishing gear.

On the morning of 15 December, after leaving Stephenville, the chief engineer reported to the master that he had had to pump out the steering gear compartment while at Stephenville because a leak had caused water to rise above the level of the floorboards. Apparently, he had also had to retighten the stuffing box around the rudder stock — a task that had also been necessary on previous occasions.

At about 1530 on 16 December, the "NADINE" completed her final trawl and departed for her home port, Cap-aux-Meules, with a catch of approximately 330,000 lb. (149.7 t) of redfish. Because heavy seas were constantly washing the afterdeck, the crew elected to leave approximately 14,500 lb. (6.6 t) of fish from the last catch in the trawl on the afterdeck instead of stowing it in the fish holds.

As the "NADINE" made for home, the bad weather reduced her surface speed to eight or nine knots (kn), and rain reduced visibility to 2 to 3 M.

Several courses were steered in increasing easterly winds (See Approximate Track, Appendix C). At about 2130, in a position approximately 15 M ESE of Pointe de l'Est, the master issued instructions regarding the navigation of the vessel to the first mate, asked to be wakened when the vessel reached Alright Reef (Trois Pierres), and then retired to his cabin. He left the mate to keep the watch. It is possible that one other person, perhaps the biologist, assisted the mate.

At about 2140, the master of the "NADINE's" sister ship, the "RALI II", who was in port aboard the fishing vessel "ADÈLE", called the "NADINE" to find out how she was progressing. The mate reported that the return voyage was proceeding uneventfully and that the "NADINE" would arrive the following morning.

At about 2230, the mate woke the master and told him that there was something wrong, the steering was not working and the vessel was settling in the water. The master went to the bridge and there noted that the rudder angle indicator read 10° to port, that the vessel was veering to the left and listing approximately 20° to port, and that the afterdeck was awash from the goalpost mast on the starboard side to the trawl warp winch on the port side. He immediately ran to check the situation in the engine-room. From the top of the companionway to the engine-room, he asked the chief engineer to pump out the lazaret. The chief engineer, who was at the foot of the companionway looking toward the tunnel's forward entrance, replied that he was doing everything he could.

On his return to the wheel-house, the master asked the mate to wake the crew members and instruct them to put on their immersion suits and assemble in the wheel-house. The biologist was seen leaving the wheel-house at about this time.

At 2235, the master sent out a distress call by very high frequency (VHF) radiotelephone informing the Coast Guard Radio Station (CGRS) at Cap-aux-Meules that the "NADINE" was sinking in position 47°26′N, 61°19′W as determined by Loran C. The CCGS "SIMON FRASER", anchored SW of Havre-Aubert Island, also heard the call and began preparing for departure.

The master then attempted to put the vessel back on course, but the steering gear failed to respond. The propeller pitch was then reduced. The "NADINE" rapidly developed a list of 60 to 70° to port.

The crew assembled in the wheel-house, but no count was taken and, reportedly, there was some panic. The crew members were advised to put on their immersion suits immediately, but some opted to delay putting them on until they got into the liferaft.

At this time, the master went to his cabin to get his immersion suit. When he returned to the wheel-house, he put on the suit, further reduced the propeller pitch to dead slow ahead, and then proceeded to the starboard boat deck. Most of the crew members were already outside.

The vessel, by this time, was lying on her port side with the stern and half of the wheel-house under water. The last of those to leave the wheel-house did so through a starboard window.

The mate informed the master that the entire crew appeared to have assembled to abandon ship. Some had gathered on the starboard side of the hull while others were standing on the starboard side of the accommodation house.

When the mate threw the starboard liferaft into the water, it inflated upside down. By standing on the starboard side of the hull, some of the crew members were able to turn the raft over. At about this time, the generator failed and the vessel was plunged into total darkness. Suddenly, at 2247, the "NADINE" sank by the stern in position 47°26'58"N, 61°19'32"W, and the crew was thrown into the water. The boatswain (bosun) was the only person who succeeded in getting into the liferaft. Shortly after he did so, the raft drifted rapidly away and the bosun lost sight of the other crew members.

The master lost contact with most of the crew when he fell into the water; only the mate and one fisherman remained with him. The master held the mate with his legs until about dawn when exhaustion forced the master to release him. The fisherman was with the master until the master was rescued.

1.3 Injuries to Persons

1.4.1 damage to the vessel.

Underwater inspections of the "NADINE" by the TSB were conducted in July 1991, at the wreck site, and in November 1991, after salvage. They revealed that:

the after port ballast tank was damaged;
the lower section of the port quarter shell plating was holed;
the afterdeck plating around the port ballast tank had buckled;
the port door to the accommodation on the boat deck was bent inward and its porthole was shattered;
the cradle of the port liferaft on the boat deck was missing;
the forward cradle and the forward portion of the lifeboat on the boat deck were missing;
the after hinge of the lazaret scuttle cover was severed; and
some lens caps from the alarm panel in the wheel-house were shattered.

1.5 Certificates

1.5.1 vessel's certificate.

The "NADINE" held a Commercial Fishing Vessel Inspection Certificate for the east coast of Canada, Home-trade Voyages, Class II, issued by the Department of Transport on 03 May 1990 and valid until 02 May 1991. The vessel had also received an exemption allowing the chief engineer to serve in that position without holding the required Chief Engineer, Fishing Vessel Certificate or its equivalent, the Engineer, Class III, Motor Certificate.

An inspection certificate (SIC 7) issued in 1989 authorized the owner, Madelipêche Inc., to increase the crew on the vessels of its fleet up to 12 provided that all crew members were supplied with immersion suits.

1.5.2 Crew's certificates

1.5.3 marine emergency duties (med) training.

Certificated members of the crew had completed the MED training required for their qualifications. One of the five other crew members had also taken MED training.

The biologist had not completed MED training. At the time of the accident, F & O scientists were not required to have such training before going to sea.

1.6 Crew's experience

All those on board were regular crew members except for the cook, who was replacing a regular member for one voyage, and the biologist, who was on the vessel for a single voyage in connection with the planned installation of a temperature-recording device on the vessel's trawl to gather data on the relationship between fish concentrations and water temperature at various depths.

1.6.1 Master

The master had obtained his certificate as Fishing Master, Class III in November 1987 and, since then, had served as master of the "NADINE". Before then, he had served two years as first mate and one year as master of another vessel while holding Fishing Master, Class IV credentials. He had previously served as fisherman and bosun on a number of other vessels in a career dating back to 1967. He received his MED training at Cap-aux-Meules in 1983.

1.6.2 Officers

The chief engineer had been a member of the crew since the spring of 1990 having previously served as chief engineer aboard the "G.C. GRANDE ENTRÉE". He had received his certificate as Engineer, Motor, Class IV, in February 1990, and taken his MED course in 1989.

The first mate had received his certificate as Fishing Master, Class IV, in April 1985.

1.6.3 Bosun

The bosun began his shipboard career on a shrimp boat. Since 1987, he had worked aboard the "NADINE", serving as bosun for the past three years.

1.6.4 Training

The crew members had been selected by the master and had either been trained by him or gained their experience on other vessels in the fleet.

The bosun did not know that he was responsible for closing other deck openings in addition to the covers for the manholes to the fish holds. He thought that the chief engineer was responsible for securing the lazaret scuttle cover as the engineer used that compartment regularly in carrying out his duties. No written guidelines had been issued concerning the closing of the openings.

Although the master had sailed aboard the same vessel for three years, he did not know that the push-buttons in way of the bridge control disengage the clutch of the propeller shaft and shut off the main engine. Nor did he know that the wheel-house alarm panel had no water level alarm for the fish holds.

1.6.5 Guest biologist

The biologist had been to sea once a year for the last three years, one voyage lasting approximately three weeks. This was her second voyage during 1990.

1.7 Weather

1.7.1 weather forecasts.

The following is the marine forecast issued by the Maritimes Weather Centre of Environment Canada at 1130 AST, Sunday, 16 December 1990:

Eastern half of Magdalen-Gulf

Gale warning still in effect. Winds from the east at 30 kn, gusting to 40, increasing to north-easterly gusts from 40 to 50 kn this afternoon. South-westerly gusts diminishing to 20 kn late this evening. Winds increasing to north-westerly gusts of up to 35 kn Monday afternoon. Rain and fog changing to snow flurries during the night ... Visibility fair with precipitation and fog. Temperature zero to three degrees.

The forecast issued at 1700 AST indicated substantially the same weather conditions as the 1130 forecast.

1.7.2 Recorded weather conditions

At about 2235, the following conditions were recorded at the Havre-aux-Maisons airport located 18.5 M west of the site of the sinking: cloud cover, visibility 7 M, light rain and wind from 110° (T) at 25 kn with gusts of up to 32 kn.

The CCGC "CAP-AUX-MEULES" sailed from Cap-aux-Meules at about 2300, 16 December, and recorded force 9 south-easterly winds, 4 to 5 m seas and visibility reduced to 2 to 4 M in rain. When she arrived at the search site at 0128, winds were ESE at 35 to 40 kn, visibility was reduced by sea spray, air temperature was 2° C and water temperature was −1° C with 6 to 7 m seas.

1.7.3 Safety code

IMO's Code of Safety for Fishermen and Fishing Vessels, under the heading "Safety of the Vessel," reads as follows:

3.1.6 The crew should be alerted to all the dangers of following or quartering seas. If excessive heeling or yawing occurs the speed should be reduced.

3.3.1 All doorways, ventilators and other openings through which water can enter into the hull or deckhouses, forecastle, etc., should be suitably closed in adverse weather conditions and accordingly all fixtures and appliances for this purpose should be maintained in good condition.

3.3.2 The fittings for closing and securing hatches should be kept in good condition.

3.3.3 All hatches and flush deck scuttles should be closed and properly secured when not in use during fishing.

3.3.5 In bad weather, inspections should be made to ensure that hatch covers and lashings are in order.

The Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) publication, Small Fishing Vessel Safety Manual, TP 10038, which addresses these safety aspects, is available on request, free of charge, to persons engaged in the fishing industry.

1.8 Navigation equipment

1.8.1 navigation instruments.

Fitted on board the "NADINE" were:

1.8.2 Aids to navigation

All navigation aids were operating satisfactorily.

1.9 Radio communications

1.9.1 inter-ship.

When the "ADÈLE" contacted the "NADINE" by radio at about 2140 on 16 December, the mate of the "NADINE" said that she had a good catch, that she had experienced no problems during the storm of 13 December, and that the wind was from the SE. He also said that heavy seas were washing over the afterdeck and that every now and then the vessel's movement was such that one could 'see the vessel's bottom'. There was no mention of a leak, but he indicated that the vessel had a 'heavy roll'.

At 2235, the "SIMON FRASER" and the CGRS Cap-aux-Meules, which were maintaining radiotelephone watch, noted the distress message from the "NADINE" and began preparing for a search and rescue operation.

1.9.2 Coast Guard radio station (CGRS)

At 2235, CGRS Cap-aux-Meules received a 'Mayday' call from the "NADINE". The caller reported the vessel's position as 47°26′N, 61°19′W, stated that there were 10 persons aboard and indicated a strong possibility that they would sink. From 2240 to 2245, the CGRS attempted to call the "NADINE" but received no reply.

1.10 Emergency equipment

1.10.1 lifeboat.

An eight-person open boat used as a lifeboat was installed on the port side of the boat deck. The severe list made it inaccessible to the crew at the time of the abandonment. It subsequently broke in two with the after portion remaining secure in the cradle and the forward portion breaking free.

1.10.2 Inflatable liferafts

There was one raft on each side of the wheel-house on the boat deck, each with a capacity of 12 persons. The rafts were not equipped with hydrostatic release devices.

Because of the severe list to port at the time of the abandonment, the port raft was not accessible. However, it floated to the surface and inflated. There was no evidence that the port raft had been used.

As the "NADINE" sank, the sea washed the crew members off and the righted liferaft away from the vessel's side, and the raft passed around the bow. The raft's sea anchor, which had not been deployed, does not release automatically.

1.10.3 Lifebuoys

Three of the four lifebuoys were recovered during the search. They were not reported to have been used during abandonment of the vessel.

1.10.4 Lifejackets and Immersion suits

Of those victims who were recovered, only one member of the crew was wearing a lifejacket when his body was found. Five others, including the two survivors, were wearing immersion suits. The remaining crew member and the biologist were wearing neither lifejackets nor immersions suits.

There was no indication of what life-saving gear the two missing victims may have used.

1.10.4.1 Type of Immersion Suits

According to the owners of the "NADINE", the vessel was equipped with nine immersion suits, all Narwhal brand, model E-38-001 (see Appendix D). Spare immersion suits were stored ashore and supplied to vessels on request. No request had been received for an additional immersion suit for the "NADINE" on this voyage, but this was not considered unusual as it was believed that government employees generally had their own immersion suits.

The suits used by the crew had a date of manufacture of 27 May 1985. Each suit had a registration certificate issued by the company listing the owners' name and the serial number.

1.10.4.2 Features of the Immersion Suits

According to the manufacturer, the suits, made of 3/16-inch neoprene, provide 42 per cent greater buoyancy than lifejackets, and they meet the Coast Guard's minimum requirements of preventing a drop of more than 2° C in body temperature over a period of six hours.

The suits are supposed to be inspected periodically with special attention being given to the zippers which should be clean, in good condition, and lubricated to ensure proper operation. Any immersion suit suspected of being defective should be removed and replaced. Useful life of the suits is estimated at 10 years. During training sessions, MED instructors require that a fellow crew member check that the other person's suit is properly fastened.

1.10.4.3 Requirement to Carry Immersion Suits

The CCG has required the use of immersion suits since 1985. The regulations require that a sufficient number of suits be available on board.

The CCG recommends that 80 per cent of immersion suits carried be "one size fits all"; 10 per cent be "adult, small"; and 10 per cent be "adult, large". The "one size fits all" suit is designed for adults weighing 50 to 150 kg (110-330 lb.), and is suitable for 90 per cent of Canadian adults. All the suits carried by the "NADINE" were "one size fits all".

During the CCG's annual inspection of the "NADINE" on 03 May 1990, none of the crew commented on the universal size of the suits or the functioning of the zippers.

At the time of the sinking, F & O did not issue immersion suits to its scientists going on sea voyages, nor was it required to do so. It could not be ascertained whether the biologist had been given an immersion suit by the crew of the "NADINE".

1.10.4.4 Storage of the Immersion Suits

The master and the chief engineer stored their suits in their cabins in the accommodation on the forecastle deck. The other suits, in their bags, were kept in a cabin used as a storeroom near the rear exit from the port alleyway of the accommodation on the main deck.

1.10.4.5 Use of the Immersion Suits

When the crew assembled in the wheel-house, no one complained of not having an immersion suit.

Two immersion suits were found in the wheel-house during an underwater inspection of the vessel in 1991.

Immersion suits are required to be designed such that the wearer has a degree of mobility in the water, but some persons wearing the suits could have difficulty in swimming to a liferaft in weather conditions such as those which existed at the time of the abandonment.

1.10.4.6 Immersion Suits: Survivors

The two survivors (the master and the bosun) reported difficulty in putting on their suits and closing the zippers. The master eventually got his closed, but the bosun, in spite of repeated attempts in the wheel-house and in the liferaft, was never able to do up his suit.

The master had received no training on immersion suits in the MED I course that he took in 1983 but, being a diver, he was familiar with donning diving equipment. At the time of the accident, he was wearing a t-shirt, underwear, cotton socks, and corduroy pants. He put on his immersion suit in the wheel-house.

The bosun had never put on an immersion suit before this accident. When he entered the liferaft, which was already swamped, he was wearing an open immersion suit over his underwear. His suit quickly filled up with water, his feet and legs became very cold, his hands became numb, and he was unable to put on the one glove that he could find.

1.10.4.7 Immersion Suits: Victims

Of the three victims who were wearing immersion suits, none had put on the entire suit or done it up to make it watertight.

The first victim was wearing a suit from the shoulders down, but had not put on the hood; no gloves were found. The second victim had put on the entire suit but the zipper was not done up to form a watertight seal; the suit was torn and the horizontal buoyancy cushion was missing, as were the gloves. The third victim was wearing an immersion suit, but it was completely open across the chest; the zipper was stuck and one glove was missing.

1.10.4.8 Inspection of the Immersion Suits

Zippers on three of the four immersion suits recovered during the rescue operation were difficult to use. However, the garments had been submerged in salt water for several hours before the victims were found. No conclusions could be drawn regarding the two suits recovered from the wheel-house during the underwater inspection of July 1991 since they had been underwater for approximately seven months. A boot was found in one of the two suits.

1.10.5 Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacons (EPIRBs)

The "NADINE" was equipped with one Class I and two Class II EPIRBs which had been installed in the fall of 1990. The owners had registered them with the Canadian Emergency Beacon Registry on 14 November 1990, but they had not yet been inspected by either the Ship Safety or the Radio inspector.

1.10.5.1 Classes of EPIRBs

In the event of a vessel sinking, Class I EPIRBs are automatically released from the vessel and automatically begin transmitting as soon as they reach the surface. A transmitter of this class, with a hydrostatic release device, had been installed on the roof of the wheel-house (see Appendix E).

Class II EPIRBs must be removed from their cases (which should be located near the life-saving equipment), manually activated, and then thrown into the water or brought aboard the lifeboats. Of the two EPIRBs of this type installed on the "NADINE", one was in the wheel-house and the other in the port alleyway of the main deck accommodation (see Appendix F).

The master stated that he had activated the Class I EPIRB in accordance with the instruction manual although he had received no training in its use. The EPIRB released automatically and came up to the surface as designed, but it did not transmit. Inspection revealed that the activation button had not been turned from "Safe" to "Arm" during installation (see Appendix G). The owners' fleet director stated that he had read the instruction manual to the master in his office. However, this assertion was not borne out by the evidence as neither the master nor the crew knew how to operate the EPIRBs. Ultimately, it is the master's responsibility to familiarize himself with all safety devices on the vessel and to provide appropriate training to the crew.

The EPIRB Regulations stipulate that vessels carrying more than two lifeboats must have Class II EPIRBs installed near the lifeboats, and that the EPIRBs should be placed in the first two lifeboats launched. The Class II EPIRBs on the "NADINE" were not used.

1.10.5.2 Recovery of EPIRBs

On 17 December 1990, the Class I EPIRB of the "NADINE" was recovered in position 47°33′N, 61°24′W.

Neither the name of the vessel nor the service date appeared on the transmitter. However, the date of the most recent battery change was indicated. The regulations specify that no vessel required to carry an EPIRB may make a Class II home-trade voyage unless the EPIRB is marked on its outer surface with the vessel's name or permit number.

In July 1991, after being under approximately 30 m of water for seven months, the two Class II EPIRBs were recovered. Both were still in their cradles.

1.10.5.3 Testing of the EPIRBs

In January 1991, the Quality Assurance Directorate of the Department of National Defence tested the Class I EPIRB and found it to be fully operational. In October 1991, the two Class II EPIRBs were inspected. One was not watertight and was not in working order. The other had operational electrical circuits but failed the short-term frequency stability test.

1.10.6 Muster List

Copies of the muster list from the "RALI II", the "NADINE's" sister ship, prepared by the owners, were posted in the wheel-house of the "NADINE", in the alleyway of the main deck accommodation and in the galley. The muster list, which is not required by existing Canadian regulations, lacked the following information:

the location of muster station where roll call will be carried out;
the emergency stations of the crew members responsible for picking up the two Class II EPIRBs;
the duties assigned to the ninth crew member;
the duties assigned to the F & O biologist or the emergency station of the crew member required to supervise her.

No notices describing the stations to be occupied by crew members during boat and fire drills were posted above the bunks in the cabins, and no such notices were required by the regulations.

1.10.7 Emergency Drills

A drill was performed on 03 May 1990 during the annual inspection. It was reported that a second drill was usually performed during the summer at sea. However, others stated that only one drill a year was usually conducted. Regulations require that such drills be performed at least once a month aboard vessels of more than 150 gross registered tons (GRT). In the course of such drills, masters are required to instruct their crews on their duties, on the layout and facilities of the vessel, and on the operation of any equipment that they may be called upon to use. The crew is required to demonstrate its familiarity with that equipment, including immersion suits.

During the annual boat and fire drill in May 1990, the crew members donned lifejackets and proceeded to muster stations with their immersion suits. Crews of other vessels were gathered on the wharf at that time, but of the 60 or so fishermen who were present, only 1 or 2 volunteers put on their immersion suits and jumped into the water.

The owners had not issued any guidelines for boat and fire drills, nor were they required to do so by regulation.

There was no general alarm bell on board the "NADINE" and none was required. During annual drills, the alarm was sounded by means of the ship's whistle.

1.11 Search and rescue (SAR)

1.11.1 distress call.

The distress call transmitted by the "NADINE" at 2235, 16 December, was received by the CGRS at Cap-aux-Meules and by the "SIMON FRASER", which was anchored SW of the island of Havre-Aubert. At 2237, CGRS Cap-aux-Meules informed the Halifax Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) of the accident.

1.11.2 SAR mobilization

On receipt of the distress message, the Halifax RCC mobilized four CCG surface units, and assigned duties to vessels in transit or berthed in the Gulf of St. Lawrence that were able to respond.

At 0128, about 2 hours and 45 minutes after the sinking, the "CAP-AUX-MEULES" became the first surface unit to reach the scene. She was unable to conduct an effective visual search because her bridge is only about 3 m above the surface of the water and the seas were running at 6 to 7 m.

At 0320, the "SIMON FRASER" arrived at the scene and assumed the duties of Coordinator Surface Search (CSS). She assigned search sectors to incoming units as they arrived.

The RCC also called on helicopters and fixed wing aircraft from Canadian Forces Bases (CFB) Summerside, Shearwater, and Greenwood. Bad weather severely hampered aircraft operations, but four helicopters and two fixed wing aircraft did get airborne on 17 December and participated in the search. The first aircraft, an Aurora from CFB Greenwood, arrived at the scene at 0445, approximately six hours after the sinking.

1.11.3 Search objectives

At 0610, the first search objective, the lifeboat, was located by the Aurora aircraft with the assistance of the "SUZANNE P". This was the forward portion of the boat, which had broken in two, and no survivors were found with it.

At 0635, the "SUZANNE P" observed a strobe light and located the master and the first of the victims. The master was picked up by the "SUZANNE P" and the victim by the "MARY HICHENS".

At daybreak, the weather became calmer with an easterly wind of 10 to 15 kn, seas of 2 to 3 m, and fog.

At 0700, using a heat detector, the Aurora located one survivor, the bosun, in liferaft No. 2151. He was later picked up by the "CAP-AUX-MEULES".

At 0715, the "CAP-AUX-MEULES" discovered the second liferaft, No. 2077. Its canopy was deflated and it had no occupants. The raft was later recovered by the "SIMON FRASER".

At about 0800, the RCC decided to restrict the search to locating victims in the water. At 0844, the last of the life-saving gear was recovered.

At 0910, the "G.C. GORTON" discovered a second victim who was later recovered by the "SIMON FRASER". At 0930, a Buffalo aircraft located a third victim who was picked up by the "MARY HICHENS". At 0942, the "SIMON FRASER" located and recovered the fourth and last victim found that day.

At 1140, the "G.C. GORTON" recovered the Class I EPIRB.

Search activities for 17 December ended with the return of the fishing vessels to port between 1800 and 2000.

On 18 December, the search resumed with the assistance of one Buffalo aircraft, one Labrador helicopter, four CCG ships and several fishing vessels.

At 1510, the "SOULEIADO" located the wreckage of the "NADINE" in position 47°26.43′N, 61°19.35′W, in 28 m of water. Divers aboard the "G.C. GORTON" recovered the body of one fisherman from the wreck. At 1800, the Halifax RCC reduced the search and, at nightfall, the operation was concluded. The outcome: two survivors, five dead and three missing.

During the underwater inspection of the wreck in July 1991, the body of the biologist was discovered in the utility room under the wheel-house . The remaining two victims were not found.

1.11.4 Survival

Studies show that, at a water temperature of −1° C , the predicted survival time for a person not wearing an immersion suit is about 20 to 60 minutes (see Appendix H). There are recorded cases of persons wearing an immersion suit surviving in water at temperatures near zero for up to 24 hours.

The master, who was floating in the water, deflated his immersion suit whenever he began to shiver, and then blew it up again with warm air. He repeated this operation approximately three to four times an hour. In addition, he refrained from urinating in order to remain dry.

The bosun, who was alone in the liferaft, launched a parachute flare at about midnight. However, no rescue unit was in sight. Approximately 15 minutes later, he saw some lights on the horizon and he launched a second parachute flare. The hand flares were not used. Shortly afterward, an aircraft overflew the site.

1.12 Design of the vessel

The steel vessel's hull was subdivided by three watertight transverse bulkheads: one collision bulkhead between the forepeak tank and the oil fuel bunker tank, at frame 76; one bulkhead between the after end of the engine-room and the forward end of the fish holds at frame 43; and one bulkhead between the after end of the fish holds and the lazaret at frame 11 (see Appendix J). The two latter bulkheads were equipped with watertight doors to the tunnel below the fish holds. There was no mechanism allowing these doors to be closed by remote control, nor was this required by regulation, and there were no notices on the doors requiring that they be kept closed at sea. It is the master's responsibility, as indicated in several CCG Ship Safety Bulletins, to ensure that such closing appliances are closed at sea when necessary.

1.12.1 Lazaret

Below the stern ramp, the steering gear compartment lies between the starboard and port ballast tanks. The net store at the forward end lies between the starboard and port oil fuel bunker tanks. Forward, on the centre line, there is a casing with a watertight door leading to the propeller shaft tunnel and, to port, a companionway to the scuttle leading to the afterdeck. The steering gear compartment and the storeroom are separated by a transverse bulkhead with a permanent opening. The lazaret has a volume of 60.4 m³ (see Appendices J and K).

1.12.2 Propeller shaft tunnel

This compartment extends longitudinally from the casing in the lazaret to the after engine-room bulkhead. It contains the propeller shaft, the bearings and the controllable-pitch mechanism. The tunnel projects into the lower portion of the fish holds. Because the service area is located to port of the shaft, the tunnel occupies a larger portion of the port hold. The tunnel has a volume of 46.9 m³.

1.12.3 Fish holds

The two longitudinal fish holds are located between the engine-room and the lazaret. They are separated by a watertight longitudinal bulkhead above the tunnel. Each hold is subdivided horizontally in two by floorboards, and vertically in three by corrugated aluminium poundboards. There is a drainage well in the middle of each hold in way of the tunnel. The starboard and port holds have volumes of 221 m³ and 213 m³ respectively.

1.12.4 Engine-room

This compartment is located forward of the fish holds, below the forecastle accommodation. The engine-room has a volume of 340 m³.

1.12.5 Openings

1.12.5.1 lazaret scuttle.

A scuttle cover mounted on two hinges and located on the port side of the afterdeck provides access to the lazaret (see Appendix J ). The scuttle cover is secured by steel wedges. The lazaret was used primarily for maintenance of the fishing gear and by the chief engineer for inspection of the steering gear. Reportedly, no one checked that this opening was secured before the return voyage and no leakage was noted in the lazaret on the last day. Neither of the two survivors had gone to the lazaret on the day of the sinking.

1.12.5.2 Tunnel

The forward door between the tunnel and the engine-room is reported to have remained open at all times on the "NADINE", as on other trawlers, and the after door at the lazaret casing was reportedly closed at the time of the accident. The master did not notice any flooding from the tunnel during his last visit to the top of the engine-room, nor was any flooding mentioned by the chief engineer who was looking toward the tunnel entrance at the time of that visit.

1.12.5.3 Manholes

When the trawl is hauled in, it is hoisted onto the afterdeck above the manholes and then opened. The catch spreads over the afterdeck and drops into the fish holds through those manholes from which the covers have been removed. The catch is then stowed in the various compartments of the holds. When a compartment is full, and before the manhole covers are replaced, silicone is applied to the rim of the manholes to ensure a proper seal. The covers are then replaced and secured with dogging clips. Without the silicone, water may leak in around the rims or dogs of the manholes. New covers are provided on request when defects are noted.

There were 20 manholes on the afterdeck of the "NADINE". Eighteen of the covers had three dogging clips, one had four, and one was a permanently secured welded plate.

During the last voyage, many members of the crew had been involved with closing the manhole covers, therefore, the bosun was unsure whether all the manholes had been sealed with silicone and secured.

Neither the owners nor the master had issued clear instructions making a specific person responsible for checking that the openings were closed.

It is common practice for the manholes to be secured during the outbound voyage to preserve the ice supply and during the return voyage to preserve the catch (see Appendices L, M and N). The CCG inspected these openings in May 1990 and found no defects.

In the interest of safety, the Large Fishing Vessel Inspection Regulations state that the covers should be secured or attached by a permanent chain. The TSB found only one piece of chain on the underside of a single cover.

1.12.5.4 Hatches

The hatches of the fish holds are used for loading ice and unloading the catch. There is one hatch for each hold on the afterdeck. The covers of the hatches are generally closed by the shore crew before the vessel leaves port and remain secured for the duration of the voyage. At the beginning of the final voyage, the covers were secured by the vessel's crew. They were still secure when the underwater inspection of the vessel was conducted in 1991.

For safety purposes, the Large Fishing Vessel Inspection Regulations state that covers must be equipped with devices to ensure that they are watertight.

1.12.5.5 Engine-room

The outside companionway to the engine-room was closed off by a watertight door on the afterdeck and there was a fire door at the top of the interior companionway to the accommodation. On each side of the hull, there was a ventilation shaft running from the upper part of the engine-room to the boat deck.

1.12.5.6 Doors to accommodation

The port door from the alleyway to the afterdeck was usually left open to improve air flow to the accommodation. The portholes on this deck are permanently secured.

1.12.5.7 Air pipes

During the vessel's mid-life refit as a seiner in 1979, the original after air pipes to the ballast tanks were replaced with air pipes without non-return valves and covers. The "NADINE" was subsequently refitted as a trawler, but the air pipes were not equipped with non-return valves or covers.

Current regulations make no reference to means of closing ventilators.

1.12.5.8 Freeing Ports

Water which broke over the bulwarks onto the afterdeck was cleared on each side of the vessel by a series of four freeing ports. The fifth and foremost port on each side was welded closed. When first launched, the "NADINE" had six ports, one measuring 0.179 m 2 and five measuring 0.336 m 2 , for a total of 1.859 m 2 .

The minimum required freeing port area for this vessel was 1.990 m 2 .

At the time of the sinking, the total freeing port area was 1.523 m 2 .

It is reported that during heavy weather the "NADINE" tended to ship water and was slow to clear water washing over the afterdeck.

1.13 Inspections

1.13.1 underwater inspections.

The underwater inspections performed at the wreck site by the TSB in April and July 1991 revealed the following:

the speed control lever was set to full speed and the propeller pitch control lever to full astern;
there were no water level alarms for the fish holds or the lazaret on the alarm panel in the wheel-house;
the two Class II EPIRBs were still secured in their cases;
the air vents to the engine-room on each side of the accommodation on the boat deck were open;
the starboard door from the afterdeck to the engine-room was closed but not secured;
the port door from the afterdeck to the accommodation alleyway was open;
approximately 10 m of netting was unrolled from the trawl drum;
fourteen manholes were secured (see Appendix M);
there was no sign of damage to the manhole covers that were in place;
six manholes were open, two to starboard and four to port;
five manhole covers were spread out over the afterdeck with their dogs turned to the open position;
there was no sign of damage to the dislodged covers;
no damage was evident to the rims of either the open or the closed manholes;
the lazaret scuttle cover was closed but not secured, the after hinge was broken, and the steel wedges were not in position;
the after door from the tunnel into the lazaret was partially open and a section of net was lying on the doorsill;
the forward door from the tunnel to the engine-room was closed but not secured.

On 10 November 1991, divers from the Quebec Police Force (SQ) inspected the hull and found that there was no major damage except for a crack in the shell plating in way of the after port ballast tank. They found that the propeller pitch control was set to astern.

1.13.2 Dockside inspection

On 08 November 1991, the floating crane "TAKLIFT 4" refloated the "NADINE" which was then towed to the wharf at Grande-Entrée, Magdalen Islands. A dockside inspection by the TSB revealed the following:

the vessel floated alongside the wharf without the use of a pump;
Engage Propeller Shaft Clutch;
Disengage Propeller Shaft Clutch;
Emergency Stop, Main Engine;
a red handle in the "use" position indicated that the main engine was in operation at the time of the sinking;
power was being provided by the port generator immediately prior to the sinking;
sea water suction;
ballast tank suctions;
keel cooling;
fire and wash-deck discharge;
overboard discharge.

During the winter of 1992, the following observations were made by the present owners:

the oily water in the lazaret was pumped into the tunnel to reduce the oily water level to about 5 cm below the floorboards in the steering gear compartment, and no appreciable ingress of water was observed; and
the after starboard ballast tank could not be permanently pumped dry.

An inspection of the lazaret by the TSB in April 1993 revealed that:

over a period of about one year, the oily water level in the lazaret had increased by some 10 cm (i.e. to about 5 cm above the floorboards in the steering gear compartment); and
the stuffing box of the rudder stock was not accessible.

1.14 Stability

When operated in the loading condition at the time of the accident with all openings subject to downflooding secured, the "NADINE" had an angle of downflooding of 45.3°, as downflooding would occur when the louvres of the engine-room ventilation shaft located on the boat deck became immersed. However, when the door to the accommodation is left open on the afterdeck, the angle of downflooding is reduced to 25.7°. The CCG Stability Standards for Fishing Vessels Footnote 5 state that "a ship is to be considered as having entirely lost her stability at (the downflooding) angle", and the criteria of CCG STAB 4 tacitly infer that the minimum downflooding angle should not be less than 30°.

Calculations were carried out by the TSB to check the vessel's subdivision and hydrostatic characteristics. These were found to be in general agreement with the builder's original data and were used in the verification of the vessel's transverse stability and trim conditions at the time of the accident.

The vessel's stability condition was assessed on the basis of the reported condition at the beginning of the return voyage in conjunction with the progressive reduction in positive stability during four hours of downflooding. With about 150 tonnes (t) of fish, the vessel was carrying only half of her maximum capacity. The fish remaining on the afterdeck only marginally affected the vessel's stability and, for the purposes of calculations, it is assumed that there was approximately 6.6t of fish in the trawl net.

At the beginning of the return voyage, the vessel had positive intact static and dynamic stability. However, because the door to the accommodation had been left open, the "NADINE" did not meet the requirements of CCG STAB 4 which include maintaining the watertight integrity of the hull.

Nevertheless, even with the lazaret, the tunnel and both fish holds filled, the vessel would have retained reserve buoyancy and remained afloat. The static and dynamic stability diminished gradually as the settling by the stern increased. The free surface effect created by the sea water on the afterdeck further reduced the trawler's residual stability. Despite the complete flooding of certain compartments, the vessel retained positive stability for a while and remained afloat until the reserve buoyancy was eliminated.

Several hours of downflooding at the reported rate would be required before the "NADINE" would sink in the prevailing conditions.

1.15 Machinery

1.15.1 bridge control.

The vessel was equipped with a Seffle bridge control system consisting of three sets of synchronized control levers: one controllable-pitch lever on the central console; one controllable-pitch lever on the bridge's port bulkhead; and one set of two levers on a console by the open starboard wheel-house window. The small lever on the left controlled the main engine speed, the larger one on the right controlled the propeller pitch. The bridge control was connected to a hydraulic controllable-pitch unit manufactured by Osborne Propellers Ltd. The pitch control unit was located in the after portion of the tunnel while the pumps were located in the engine-room beneath the floorboards.

The vessel could be stopped at sea from the wheel-house by:

pressing the black main engine emergency stop button;
pressing the propeller shaft clutch release button;
reducing the propeller pitch to zero;
reducing the speed of the main engine.

When the ship was being abandoned, the propeller pitch lever was set to "two ahead", a setting equivalent to the neutral position. In other words, the pitch was reduced to zero.

1.15.2 Recurring controllable-pitch failures

It was stated that on many occasions following electrical power failures while the vessel was at sea, the pitch had suddenly and automatically changed to astern while the vessel was under way. The controllable-pitch alarms apparently did not sound when this happened.

The pitch control unit on board the "RALI II" is similar to that aboard the "NADINE". Under the supervision of the Head, Laurentian Vessels Branch of F & O, the performance of the sister ship's pitch control unit was tested on 17 September 1991. It was found that when a power failure occurs while the vessel is going full ahead, the propeller pitch changes from full ahead to full astern in 7 minutes and 15 seconds. On the other hand, if the vessel is not moving and the propeller is immobile, the propeller pitch does not change. The test report therefore concludes that when the controllable pitch becomes inoperative while the vessel is going full ahead, the thrust of the water against the blades gradually pushes the propeller pitch from ahead to astern. When the main engine is on slow ahead, it takes significantly longer for the pitch to change from ahead to astern.

Information from the manufacturer of the controllable-pitch propeller confirmed that "hydrodynamic forces will move the pitch to full astern if the hydraulic pressure is lost." How quickly this occurs is partly dependent on the rate at which "the oil escapes from the hydraulic intermediate shaft to the tank."

The TSB data bank, which contains data on occurrences since 1976, has no report of these power failures or pitch reversals on the "NADINE".

1.15.3 Steering gear

The electrical drive component of the electro-hydraulic steering gear was a non-watertight electric motor installed on the bulkhead aft of the steering gear compartment in the lazaret.

When the master went up to the bridge, the vessel was turning to port, and the rudder angle indicator, which was no longer operational, showed a constant rudder angle of 10° to port.

The master first attempted to set the vessel back on course by adjusting the autopilot, but the autopilot did not respond. He then disengaged the autopilot, but the vessel still failed to respond. After these attempts, the pitch was set to neutral.

The master reported that his attempts to use the steering in the manual mode were unsuccessful. This is contrary to the results of tests conducted on the sister ship, "RALI II", with the wheel in the manual mode. These tests showed that the telemotor turns the rudder even when there is no electrical power to the steering gear.

The steering gear of the "NADINE" was operating normally on departure from Stephenville.

1.15.4 Power system

Normal lighting was provided by a power system consisting of two generators used alternately. They could not operate in parallel. If one generator broke down, the other had to be turned on manually from the engine-room. At the time of the sinking, the port generator was in operation.

1.15.5 Emergency lighting

The emergency lighting in the companionways and the engine-room was powered by two batteries connected in series. The power supply for the emergency lighting was located in the wheel-house but, at the time of the sinking, it was not turned on. The lights went out before the vessel went down, and the crew abandoned ship in total darkness.

1.16 Information on the pumping system

1.16.1 pump suctions.

The steering gear compartment, the storeroom of the lazaret, the tunnel and both fish holds each contained one drainage suction. The engine-room had two.

Drainage was effected by two main pumps: one connected to a generator and the other to an electric motor. In an emergency, a third, auxiliary pump could be placed in service. In addition, a manual pump could be used to pump out the forecastle storeroom. The vessel carried no submersible automatically activated pump. All pumping was initiated from the engine-room.

An inspection of the valves following the refloating of the vessel indicated that no pumping of the lazaret, the tunnel, or the engine-room was under way when the vessel went down. Only the valves to the after ballast tanks were open.

1.16.2 Alarm panel

A panel in the wheel-house contains sound and visual alarms for the tunnel and engine-room only. There are no water level detectors for the fish holds or the lazaret, which includes the after storeroom and the steering gear compartment (see photographs, Appendix P).

The panel was recovered from the wreck but, although several indicator bulb filaments were broken, it could not be determined if the bulbs were illuminated at the time of the sinking.

The installation of water level alarms in the various compartments of a Canadian fishing vessel is not a regulatory requirement.

1.16.3 Leak

Two days before the sinking, on Friday 14 December, the chief engineer pumped out the lazaret using the engine-room pump. He retightened the stuffing box of the rudder stock at about the same time. The leak must have been relatively large because the water was above the floorboards in the steering gear compartment. The leak, of unknown origin, appears to have been restricted to the steering gear compartment and was not reported to the master by the chief engineer until the following day. The master did not ask the chief engineer about it again nor did he personally check the water level in the lazaret to ensure that the leak had been permanently plugged.

The master saw the chief engineer go down into the lazaret on the day of the sinking, but he received no reports of a further leak. The bosun did not see the leak on 14 December and did not go down into the lazaret on 16 December.

1.17 Information on the voyage

1.17.1 loading.

At the beginning of the voyage, the fresh water tanks were full and the fuel bunkers were down approximately 250 mm. Fifty-six tonnes of ice had been loaded into the fish hold to preserve the catch.

According to the master, the fish holds of most stern trawlers are loaded from the stern forward. Because the "NADINE" was trimmed by the stern in the light condition, the fish holds were loaded diagonally, that is, simultaneously in the forward portion of one and the after portion of the other. The middle portions were never filled to capacity because the approximate 147t (325,000 lb.) per-trip quota for each vessel prevented the "NADINE" from taking on a full load of redfish. The fish holds of the "NADINE" had a maximum capacity of 325t (716,800 lb.).

During this last voyage, the "NADINE" caught a total of approximately 149.7t (330,000 lb.) in five trawls.

When the fish from the last catch was left on the afterdeck in the trawl, the 1 m high, 10 m long trawl was not secured on deck but, instead, was wedged against the trawl drum. Stowing the balance of the last catch in the holds would have taken approximately 20 minutes.

Before the sinking, the two ballast tanks near the steering gear compartment were empty. These tanks can be used to trim the vessel when necessary.

1.17.2 Impact

According to the witnesses, the vessel had not struck a reef or other object which may have caused a leak.

The master normally had the conduct of the vessel during trawling operations. When he handed control to the mate at about 2130 on 16 December, he had been directing the crew for more than two days except for a few rest periods. He had been in his cabin for less than an hour when he was summoned to the wheel-house by the mate at 2230, 16 December.

The mate had been given time to rest during the day of 16 December before he relieved the master, taking over the navigation watch. From the evidence, it was not possible to determine with certainty whether or not the regulatory requirement for a vessel the size of the "NADINE" to have an additional qualified person present on the bridge was met.

Crews have approximately two days off between fishing voyages, which last five to six days each.

1.19 Maintenance and safety

Following each voyage, the mate and the chief engineer would submit a list of repairs to be performed by the shore maintenance crew. Records were kept only of maintenance to the main engine and the auxiliaries (oil changes, etc.). The fleet director would meet the master and the chief engineer to discuss requisitions and to pass on the owners' instructions for the fishing operations.

The owners do not appear to have received any documentation from the CCG, and the fleet director had discontinued receiving the Notices to Shipping because he did not consider them useful. However, no differentiation between the Notices to Mariners, Notices to Shipping and Ship Safety Bulletins could be made.

The master had sole responsibility for safety on board.

2.0 Analysis

2.1 leak during last layover.

The cause of the leak discovered while the vessel was in Stephenville is unclear. There is no evidence to suggest a striking or bottom contact. The stuffing box of the rudder stock was tightened and the lazaret was pumped out. It is stated that, on this vessel and other fleet vessels, the stuffing box had to be retightened on a regular basis. It is unclear whether the corrective action taken in Stephenville was permanent. The survivors had not visited the lazaret during the return voyage. Because the stuffing box remained inaccessible and the owners provided scanty maintenance records, the condition and maintenance of the stuffing box remain unknown. It was reported that similar leaks had occurred in the past. Whatever the extent of the leak, the April 1993 inspection revealed that when the vessel was dockside and the rudder stock left motionless over a long period of time, ingress of water in the steering gear compartment was negligible. Evidence suggests that the rate of ingress of water before the foundering could only have occurred through downflooding.

2.2 Closing of the openings

Because the crew decided to leave part of the final catch on deck, the manholes located under the trawl became inaccessible. The covers for those manholes therefore remained unsecured. Other manholes located in the forward portion of the afterdeck were also left unsecured, probably because they were overlooked.

Although the mate had had some rest during the day of 16 December, he may well have been fatigued from two days of fishing when he took over the final watch. It is also possible that there was no other crew member in the wheel-house to help him remain alert. The mate may thus have been operating at something less than peak efficiency as the emergency developed.

As the chief engineer did not have a fixed schedule, it was impossible to determine whether he was working on the evening of 16 December.

2.4 First Indication of a leak

When the "NADINE" was called by the "ADÈLE", the first mate mentioned that the vessel 'rolled heavily'. This could have been an indication that the vessel's stability had possibly been altered by downflooding. An accumulation of water combined with the associated free surface effect can affect a vessel's manoeuvrability. Confirmation that the vessel was in trouble came when the mate on the bridge realized that the steering gear had failed. Shortly thereafter, the flooding in the lazaret was discovered. The flooding had caused the electric motor for the steering gear to short-circuit and the electro-hydraulic steering gear to fail. There was no water level detector in that compartment and, therefore, no alarm in the wheel-house to alert the bridge team.

Hull inspections carried out in 1991 revealed that the flooding was not caused by a major leak below the waterline. Furthermore, since the "NADINE" was 15 years old and had weathered storms of equal or greater severity on numerous occasions, it is unlikely that the trawler's design was a factor in this occurrence.

2.5 Flooding of the compartments

The reported increase in stern trim must have resulted from flooding of the vessel's after compartments. A leak in the stuffing box may have contributed to the flooding, but the lazaret compartment would have flooded through the scuttle in any event since underwater inspections revealed that the lazaret scuttle cover wedges were not in place, and that the cover was therefore not secure. One of the hinges of the cover was damaged, probably as a result of battering by the waves which were constantly washing over the deck while the cover was not secure. The motion of the water on the afterdeck, induced by the vessel's pitching, rolling and listing, would have started the trawl moving also and caused the unsecured manhole covers to the fish holds to become dislodged from their rims.

There were twice as many closed but unsecured covers on the port fish hold as on the starboard hold (see Appendix M). The unsecured manhole covers furthest aft were more likely to be the first open because they would be disturbed by the trawl. The furthest aft unsecured manholes were on the port side fish hold. In all probability, the port hold flooded first through the after manholes. As the after compartments were flooding, the trim by the stern would have increased, and more and more sea water would have washed over the afterdeck above the fish holds.

Because the doors to the tunnel were not secure, water was able to flood from the lazaret into the tunnel, and from the tunnel into the engine-room. The open doors of the alleyway and the companionway on the afterdeck would also have allowed water to flood the engine-room.

Because the air pipes to the after ballast tanks were not fitted with non-return valves or covers, downflooding into these tanks could also have occurred.

Because the port door to the accommodation had been left open in the bad weather, sea water could have entered the accommodation area as the vessel heeled to port.

When the vessel's list reached 45°, downflooding would also have occurred through the louvres of the engine-room port ventilation shaft.

2.6 Crew assembly

Because of a combination of fatigue and inadequate training in boat and fire drills, the crew's performance in the emergency may have been somewhat inefficient. Although participation in boat and fire drills was mandatory on board the "NADINE", one drill a year is simply not enough to enable a crew to become thoroughly familiar with emergency procedures.

The muster list that had been posted by the owners was a copy of the sister ship's ("RALI II") and did not contain the location of the muster station, the emergency stations of the crew members responsible for picking up the Class II EPIRBs and the duties assigned to the ninth crew member and the biologist. The lack of such information may well have detracted from the crew's handling of the emergency.

The master's decision to have the mate wake each member of the crew individually used up much of the time available for the abandonment. The last members to be awakened had little time to get dressed and get to the boat deck before the vessel sank. Also, the mate's involvement with the alerting process delayed his efforts to launch the liferaft. Although it is reported that the ship's whistle was used to sound the alarm, there is no indication that it was heard. Nonetheless, assembly took place, but no head count was taken outside the wheel-house.

When the wheel-house was evacuated, the propeller pitch had been reduced to neutral, but the propeller shaft was not disengaged and the main engine was not stopped.

2.7 Launching of the liferaft

The crew members' limited or lack of training in emergency procedures may have contributed to the difficulty that they experienced in launching the starboard liferaft. Weather was certainly a factor, but the use of proper procedures might have enabled more than one crew member to make use of the raft.

Inflatable liferafts such as those carried by the "NADINE" are designed to be boarded from the sea. One person can jump onto the canopy and go inside the raft, but others must jump into the water next to the raft and climb in with the help of the person already aboard.

2.8 Loss of lighting

When the on-line port generator flooded, the vessel was thrown into total darkness. No emergency lighting was available because the switch in the wheel-house was not turned on. The lack of lighting may have contributed to the confusion and panic that attended the abandonment.

2.9 Sinking

Because the initial downflooding took place in after compartments, the vessel initially trimmed by the stern and the stern trim increased as the downflooding continued. When reserve buoyancy was lost, the vessel sank by the stern.

2.10 Survival and rescue

The survival experience of the "NADINE's" crew was directly related to the use of immersion suits. The master, who had used the suit correctly, survived in the water for a long time with relatively few ill effects. Those who had donned their immersion suits but had not done them up stood a better chance of surviving than those who had not put them on at all. Crew members who did not make use of the suits stood little chance of surviving for more than a few minutes.

To be fully effective, an immersion suit must be made watertight. It is essential, therefore, that the zipper be tightly closed. Some crew members underestimated the importance of donning their immersion suits and closing the zippers before leaving the wheel-house.

2.11 EPIRBs

The EPIRBs had been installed on the "NADINE" shortly before the end of the 1990 season. However, neither the master nor the crew knew how to operate them properly, and the EPIRBs therefore contributed nothing to the rescue operation. None of the three units transmitted a distress signal, but the vessel's radio distress call was picked up by the CCG, and rescue units had no difficulty in locating the site of the sinking.

2.12 Damage

Underwater examination of the hull showed only one crack that could have resulted in a leak. The cause of that crack is unknown. However, witnesses stated that no impact was felt before the sinking, and no evidence exists of any pre-sinking structural problem.

The area of the crack would have been the first part of the vessel to make contact with the ocean floor. It is thus considered that the damage may have occurred when the vessel hit the bottom.

After the vessel was salvaged, she floated evenly without the use of a pump despite having water in the lazaret and the two after ballast tanks.

2.13 The Biologist

The biologist had not taken part in a boat and fire drill on the "NADINE" and, at the time of the accident, members of the F & O staff, like the biologist, were not required to take a MED course before going to sea.

It is not known whether the biologist had been issued an immersion suit. If she did have one, it would probably have been kept in the storeroom that contained the crew's suits.

Although there are several possibilities, it is not known how the body of the biologist came to be in the utility room below the wheel-house.

What is known is that one body and two immersion suits were found inside the wheel-house, and that divers reported a significant current inside the wreck. The crew member and the biologist may have been putting on their immersion suits in the wheel-house when the vessel went down.

2.14 Fatigue

It is likely that on the final day of the voyage the crew members were suffering from fatigue after a busy period of fishing. Evidence suggests that they may therefore have paid less attention than they ordinarily would to routine tasks such as replacing and sealing the manhole covers.

Some of the crew members were undoubtedly suffering from the cold. Their ability to launch the liferaft correctly may have suffered as a result.

3.0 Findings

3.1 findings.

The source of the leak discovered at Stephenville and whether that leak was permanently plugged remain unknown. The leak was not reported to the master until 15 December when the vessel was already under way.
The stuffing box of the rudder stock had leaked on a number of occasions and had to be retightened in Stephenville.
Five of the 10 persons aboard had taken MED courses.
Only the starboard inflatable liferaft was accessible to the crew at the time of the sinking. The port liferaft and the lifeboat were inaccessible because of the pronounced list of the vessel.
Because of inadequate training, not all crew members knew that they should put on their immersion suits before abandoning ship.
Five crew members donned their immersion suits, but only one closed the suit to make it watertight.
Both survivors had put on their immersion suits.
Some of the crew members had difficulty in putting on their immersion suits and doing up the closures to make them watertight.
The Class I EPIRB was released automatically but failed to function because it had not been activated when it was installed on the vessel.
The two Class II EPIRBs were not activated and were not thrown overboard or taken aboard the liferaft.
The crew had not received adequate training in the use of EPIRBs.
The EPIRBs were not marked so as to be easily identifiable.
The crew was not required to perform a standard life-saving drill every month.
The muster list did not call for taking a crew count in a specific location, nor did it assign responsibility for the deployment of EPIRBs.
The transverse bulkheads forward and aft of the fish holds on the "NADINE" were not watertight because the tunnel doors had not been secured.
There was no notice on the watertight doors indicating that they should be kept closed.
The lazaret scuttle cover was not secured.
The port door of the alleyway leading to the afterdeck was open and the starboard door leading to the engine-room was not secured.
There were no watertight covers for the air pipes.
The total area of the freeing ports was less than the minimum required for safety.
The switches for the emergency lighting system were in the open (off) position and the emergency lighting did not come on after the power failure.
There were 143t of fish stowed in the fish holds and another 7t on the afterdeck (figures are approximate).
Before the flooding of the after compartments, the trawler's static and dynamic stability would still have met STAB 4 standards had the openings on the afterdeck been secured.
Only the valves for the after ballast tanks were open.
The main engine emergency stop button and the propeller shaft clutch engagement and disengagement buttons were not labelled and the master was unfamiliar with them.
The main engine was not turned off before the crew abandoned ship.
The alarm panel in the wheel-house did not include water level alarms for the fish holds and the lazaret.
The starboard fish hold had two unsecured manholes and the port hold had four. About 10 manholes had not been sealed with silicone.
After the sinking, the main engine speed control was found in the full speed position and the propeller pitch control in the full astern position.
The electro-hydraulic steering gear was the first auxiliary mechanism to fail.
The vessel was running before heavy seas.
As a result of flooding, the stern of the trawler settled and a list to port developed, but this went unnoticed until the situation became critical.
The reserve buoyancy was eliminated as a result of flooding.
Only one person was able to board the starboard liferaft.
The shell plating in way of the after port ballast tank was found ruptured on the ocean floor.
Although the CCGC "CAP-AUX-MEULES" was the first unit to arrive at the site of the sinking (LKP), her small size prevented her from making a thorough visual search in the heavy seas.

The "NADINE" sank because the openings on the afterdeck and in the transverse bulkheads were not secured. Water was thus able to enter the vessel and eventually flood the lazaret, the fish holds and the engine-room. This ingress gradually reduced the vessel's stability until all reserve buoyancy was lost and the vessel sank. Poor weather, darkness, lack of training and the suddenness of the sinking hindered the abandonment and contributed to the loss of life.

4.0 Safety Action

4.1 action taken, 4.1.1 company - madelipêche inc..

The immersion suits carried on the "NADINE" were of a universal size and difficult for some crew members to put on and to close so that they were watertight. Since this occurrence, the company has provided each crew member of its fleet with his own personal suit. The company has also purchased some extra-large suits.

4.1.2 Department of Fisheries and Oceans (F & O)

As a result of this occurrence, F & O now requires that all members of its seagoing scientific staff attend Marine Emergency Duties (MED) courses.

4.1.3 Canadian Coast Guard (CCG)

The Class I Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB) on the "NADINE" released automatically but it had not been activated. A subsequent inspection indicated that the activation button of the EPIRB had not been turned from the "Safe" to the "Arm" position during installation. Subsequently, the CCG issued a Notice to Shipping and a Ship Safety Bulletin (SSB No. 1/91) advising of the importance for all Class I float-free EPIRBs to be set for automatic operation as soon as they are installed on a vessel.

4.1.4 Transportation Safety Board (TSB)

4.1.4.1 marine safety advisories.

Based on the early evidence of the investigation, in May 1991, the following areas of safety concern were brought to the attention of the CCG:

adequacy of MED training and survival skills of the ship's crew members;
adequacy of practices with respect to fire and boat drills;
adequacy of set-up procedures and operational practices for EPIRBs;
operational practices for securing openings in the ship's watertight bulkheads; and
serviceability of immersion suits.

4.1.4.2 Marine safety recommendations

Following the sinking of the scallop dragger "CAPE ASPY" in January 1993, the Board identified safety deficiencies common to both the "NADINE" and the "CAPE ASPY" and issued three recommendations:

In view of the continuing loss of vessels due to downflooding through unsecured openings, the Board recommended that:

The Department of Transport develop and implement measures to ensure that owners, operators and masters of vessels under its jurisdiction have effective training and procedures for securing all openings sufficient to preserve the watertight integrity of the hull. Transportation Safety Recommendation M93-01

In its reply, Transport Canada (TC) has confirmed that watertight integrity and its effects on vessel stability will be brought to the attention of the industry by the CCG Examiners of Masters, Mates and Engineers by intensifying the examination in these areas. Further, the CCG issued a SSB urging mariners and operators to keep watertight openings closed at all times except when it is absolutely necessary to open them to gain access to spaces (SSB No. 16/92). The CCG also reissued previous SSB Nos. 1/83 and 4/87 on the same subject.

In view of the continuing apparent lack of knowledge of critical safety information by fishermen, much of which has already been promulgated by TC in SSBs, the Board recommended that:

The Department of Transport evaluate the effectiveness of its distribution practices for all marine safety information aimed at fishing masters and fishermen. Transportation Safety Recommendation M93-02

In response to Recommendation M93-02, TC has issued a Special Edition of the SSB to reach several thousand new audience members including many fishing vessel owners. This Special Edition requested all recipients to inform their colleagues, shipowners and companies of the existence of the SSB so that they can be added to the mailing list. It also listed the titles of all SSBs published since 1977 for ease of reference and included them in a Notice to Mariners.

In view of the extremely harsh physical conditions under which abandonment may be required, the Board believes that all life-saving appliances must be readily accessible and easily deployable for safe abandonment. Therefore, the Board recommended that:

The Department of Transport ensure that liferafts on all federally approved or inspected vessels are stowed in such a manner as to permit easy manual launching under distress and any environmental conditions likely to be encountered by that vessel. Transportation Safety Recommendation M93-03

In response to Recommendation M93-03, the CCG has issued SSB No. 9/93 which provided recommended guidelines for the stowage and installation of throw-over type inflatable liferafts for ease of launching under icing conditions.

The regulations require fishing vessels to be fitted with freeing ports of adequate area to facilitate rapid and effective freeing of shipped water from the deck. There were six freeing ports on each side of the "NADINE". However, the fifth and foremost port on each side was welded closed. Reportedly, the "NADINE" was slow to clear water washing over the afterdeck.

It is not uncommon to find freeing ports welded or bolted shut on many fishing vessels to prevent the catch or equipment from slipping through. Apparently, the crews do not always realize the perilous effect of water retained on deck.

Following a 1990 occurrence involving the sinking of the fishing vessel "STRAITS PRIDE II", the Board was concerned that a vessel's inability to adequately drain shipped seas off the deck will impair stability. Therefore, the Board recommended that:

The Department of Transport require the installation of water level detectors in all compartments below the waterline on large fishing vessels. Transportation Safety Recommendation M92-09

In response, TC stated that it will continue to give wide distribution to the Small Fishing Vessel Safety Manual, TP 10038, which covers the subject of stability on small fishing vessels.

4.2 Action required

4.2.1 water level detectors.

The ingress of water flooding the lazaret, the fish holds and eventually the engine-room of the "NADINE" gradually reduced the vessel's stability until all reserve buoyancy was lost and the vessel sank. The flooding of the lazaret had caused the electric motor to short-circuit and had disabled the steering gear. Lazarets present special safety hazards resulting in numerous fishing vessel casualties. Therefore, the North Pacific Fishing Vessels Owners Association of the United States advocates the fitting of water level alarms in lazarets.

Fishing vessels are fitted with numerous openings above and below decks and their watertight integrity is constantly dependent upon the vigilance and timely reaction of the crew. In recent years, failure to monitor and redress water ingress in a timely manner has resulted in the sinking of several fishing vessels. For example, the fishing vessel "NORTHERN OSPREY" sank when water in the flooded engine-room was not detected in time. The high water level alarm in the engine-room was disabled at the time.

The installation of water level alarms in various compartments of fishing vessels is presently not required by regulation. Accordingly, neither water level detectors nor alarms for the fish holds, the lazaret and the steering gear compartments were installed on the "NADINE". The absence of water level detectors and bridge alarms caused a delay in the crew's appreciation of the flooding that eventually led to the sinking of the "NADINE".

Delay in identifying and draining water from any compartment can jeopardize a vessel's seaworthiness, due to the water's adverse effect on vessel stability through free surface effect. Therefore, the Board recommends that:

The Department of Transport require the installation of water level detectors in all compartments below the waterline on large fishing vessels. Transportation Safety Recommendation M94-06

4.2.2 Fire and boat drills on fishing vessels

The decision to abandon a vessel at sea is often made under intense pressure in a very short time. The more familiar crew members are with their vessel's survival gear and how to use it, the better they will be able to respond to the emergency.

The donning of immersion suits during emergency drills conducted several times a season can reduce the time required to find and don the equipment in a real emergency. During such exercises, defects in immersion suit zippers or in lifeboat release mechanisms, etc. can be identified and rectified before an actual emergency arises.

Some crew members on the "NADINE" had difficulty donning and closing their suits. Some suits were found torn, the zippers on others were poorly maintained and difficult to close. Of the five crew members who donned their immersion suits, only the master was able to close his suit properly. The bosun, in spite of repeated attempts, was never able to do up his suit; he had never donned an immersion suit prior to this accident.

The existing Boat and Fire Drill Regulations require that the drills be conducted regularly at intervals of not more than one month on vessels of the "NADINE's" category. The master of every such ship is required to enter in the official logbook or in another register the full particulars of each boat and fire drill. However, such drills were not held regularly on the "NADINE". It is not uncommon for ships required by regulations to hold regular fire and boat drills, not to do so.

Since crews who have little or no experience in using survival gear are prone to making fatal mistakes, the Board recommends that:

The Department of Transport take whatever measures are necessary to ensure that the safety intent of the Boat and Fire Drills Regulations is being fulfilled by owners and operators of fishing vessels. Transportation Safety Recommendation M94-07

4.2.3 Accessibility of life preservers

During the abandonment of the "NADINE", the crew members had to go below deck to retrieve their immersion suits from a storeroom near the after exit from the port alleyway of the accommodation to the main deck.

In this occurrence, the situation developed so quickly that the last of the crew had to leave the ship through the starboard window of the wheel-house. Under such circumstances, it is critical that life support equipment, such as immersion suits, be readily accessible and rapidly retrievable without confusion.

In view of the record of rapid capsizing and sinking of fishing vessels, often leaving crews insufficient time to avail themselves of on-board life-saving equipment, the Board recommends that:

The Department of Transport conduct a formal evaluation of current practices for the stowage of life preservers and immersion suits on fishing vessels with a view to ensuring immediate accessibility. Transportation Safety Recommendation M94-08

4.2.4 Muster lists

The current Boat and Fire Drill Regulations do not require vessels with 12 crew members or less to have written muster lists. Being manned by nine crew members, the "NADINE" was not required to have a written muster list. Nevertheless, the "NADINE's" muster list lacked critical safety information; e.g. the location of the muster station for head counts, the emergency stations of the crew members responsible for picking up the two EPIRBs, and the duties assigned to each crew member, including the guest.

In order to survive abandonment at sea, crew members depend upon their foreknowledge and preparedness — their own and their crewmates'. Muster lists identify vital duties that must be performed in emergencies and assign them to each crew member; muster lists also provide crew members with a plan to manage an emergency situation, thus increasing their chance of survival. Since muster lists present little financial implication for owners, the Board recommends that:

The Department of Transport encourage all fishing vessel masters/owners to prepare and maintain appropriate muster lists for each vessel, regardless of the crew size. Transportation Safety Recommendation M94-09

4.2.5 MED Training for Fishermen

During most of the year in Canadian waters, protection against hypothermia is essential for survival. On the "NADINE", some crew members and the biologist were not wearing their immersions suits during the abandonment. Only 5 of the 10 persons aboard had taken MED training and only 2 survived. Due to inadequate training, not all crew members on the "NADINE" knew that they should don their immersion suits before abandoning ship. Lack of training in survival skills undoubtedly contributed to the loss of lives.

In a January 1993 occurrence involving the sinking of the scallop trawler "CAPE ASPY", 10 of the survivors were rescued from their liferaft after three hours, and 1 other was pulled alive from the frigid sea approximately six hours after the vessel sank. Immersion suits were credited for saving the lives of these survivors.

Between 1986 and 1991, over 30 Canadian fishing vessels were recorded as being lost due to capsizing, foundering or sinking. Having to abandon their vessels, over 70 fishermen died in this same period. As in this occurrence, some of these losses were exacerbated by a lack of understanding of safety considerations routinely covered in MED training.

At present, uncertificated crew members are not required to receive such training. Currently, on fishing vessels of between 100 and 400 GRT, only the master is required to have certification. However, approximately 98 per cent of Canadian commercial fishing vessels are less than 100 GRT, and the majority of them are manned by uncertificated crews.

As a result of the investigation into the sinking of the Canadian fishing vessel "STRAITS PRIDE II" in 1990, the Board recommended that:

The Department of Transport ensure that personnel who regularly crew closed-construction fishing vessels receive formal training in life-saving equipment and survival techniques. Transportation Safety Recommendation M92-06

It is understood that TC has completed a proposed amendment to the Canada Shipping Act .CSA) that would meet the intent of this recommendation. However, it is not known when this amendment will come into effect. In the meantime, lack of knowledge with respect to life-saving and survival techniques continues to reduce fishermen's chances of survival in emergency situations.

This report concludes the Transportation Safety Board's investigation into this occurrence. Consequently, the Board, consisting of Chairperson, John W. Stants, and members Gerald E. Bennett, Zita Brunet, the Hon. Wilfred R. DuPont and Hugh MacNeil, has authorized the release of this report.

Appendix A - Sketch of the "NADINE"

Appendix B - Fishing zone 1

Appendix C - Approximate track of the "NADINE" on 16 December 1990

Appendix D - Survival suit (immersion suit)

Appendix E - Sketch of 406H(Y) and 406HH(Y) Lokata EPIRBs

Appendix F - Sketch of 406M(Y) Lokata EPIRB

Appendix G - Class I EPIRB control panel

Appendix H - Cold water survival chart

Appendix J - Cross-section forward of frame No. 9

Appendix K - Layout of compartments

Appendix L - Photograph of a manhole cover and its dogging clip

Appendix M - Diagram of manholes, hatches and doorways as found after the sinking

Appendix N - Condition of manholes and covers after the refloating

Appendix O - Wheel-house console controls

Appendix P - Photographs

Appendix Q - Glossary

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Classic Yacht Nadine, Poole, Hampshire, England - Sleeps 4

South and South East England

Classic Yacht Nadine

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£1800 to £2400

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About Classic Yacht Nadine

Indulge yourself aboard Classic Yacht Nadine, along with a Hot Tub Jacuzzi on the upper Sun Deck and Beautiful Views across Poole Harbour Bay. Moored on a Private Berth at Cobbs Quay Marine along with a busy Yachtsman's Bar and Bistro Restaurant.

For a romantic couple or a family group, experience a joyous walk down the marina pontoon and step aboard your delightful waterside residence. The Captain will meet and greet you in the private free car park, with a brief tour of the Classic Yacht and how to use the Jacuzzi and the Galley Kitchen, then will leave you in peace for your Holiday booking. The Captain and our Office is always on standby to assist with any questions and will assist with your every need, during your stay. There is Superfast Broadband and free WiFi, a 45” Smart TV with Netflix, should you desire Romantic Movies, Entertainment for your children, Music Channels or maybe Live Sports

The Captain can also assist in preparing The Yacht prior to your arrival, for any special and personalised occasions on board. Once booked, we will send out your Welcome email along with some extra luxury ideas such as French Champagne or Italian Prosecco on ice by the Jacuzzi on the Upper Deck, with Belgium Chocolates, Fresh Flowers, a Dozen Red Roses or some decorations for Birthdays or Anniversaries.

Classic Yacht Nadine is a Shepards Motor Yacht that has been restored and upgraded over the last five years. She was custom built at a purchase cost of over £6 million (in current value) and finished to European Specifications by Trojan Yachts situated by Niagara Falls in Canada. She was bought down the St. Lawrence waterways to New York where she was shipped to her owners in the United Kingdom.

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Owner details:

Fortis Villas joined Independent Cottages in April 2023

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Amenities / Facilities

Waterside Location
Beach Nearby
Off-Road Parking
Accessible by Public Transport
Bike Storage
Golf Nearby
iPod Docking
Satellite/ cable TV
Washing Machine
Tumble Dryer
Dish washer
Horse Riding Nearby
Family Activity
Off Grid / Remote

Location (Hampshire)

Temptation Entrance & Lounge

Ø Entering through the back deck double doors you will find yourself in the spacious Saloon

Ø Large surround windows give fantastic natural light throughout the saloon with blinds and curtains to give increased privacy

Ø Port side you will find 2 x armchairs, one of which will convert to a single bed

Ø Port side French antique small chest of drawers

Ø Starboard side you will find a large and comfortable 3-seater sofa which also converts to a double sofa bed A glass coffee table is well positioned in the centre of the Saloon

Ø Heading forward you will find the original cabinets with the fold out drinks cabinet and plenty of storage in drawers and cupboards

Ø Large windows give a fantastic view of the Bridge

Ø Connecting door leading through to the Bridge

Ø In the Bridge you will find a large bench style helm seat with lots of storage space visibility through the windscreens and port and starboard windows

Ø Access doors each side to the side decks and step access to the flybridge

Ø Large central helm position with original steering wheel

Ø On the starboard side you will find

Ø Air-conditioning system is operational but in need of a service - Stainless steel portholes

Temptation Kitchen Galley

Ø The Kitchen Galley is a state-of-the-art custom-made display of Stainless-Steel Cupboards and Corianna Worktops that cost over £30,000.

Ø There is an electric oven and hob with Neff extractor fan

Ø And a powerful Microwave and a Fridge Freezer

Ø There is a water filter system for drinking tap water

Ø The Kitchen Galley also provides access to the pump room where there is an additional second deep freezer

Ø The Quality of the Kitchen area is suitable for hiring a Professional Private Chef and many of our guests have experienced fine dining whilst enjoying the rear deck dining table at the rear deck of the Yacht

Temptation Kitchen Dining Area

Ø To the right of the Kitchen is another custom-made Dining area, for up to 8 visiting Guests around an intimate table made of the same Corianna

Ø Another delightful and winter season dining area to socialise, whilst your partner or Chef prepares meals in your view

Temptation Luxury Accommodation

Ø Heading forward of the Galley is the crews’ quarters or additional cabin

Ø V shape double berth with wardrobe

Ø Ensuite toilet and shower

Ø Access to the laundry room with washer, dryer, storage and hanging wardrobe space

Ø Head back up and through the galley you will find yourself in the corridor which houses the main living areas

Ø The large portholes give lovely natural light throughout the corridors and cabins

Ø The first door gives access to the twin bedroom with good size beds, storage, and wardrobe

Ø Ensuite shower and day head, which is beautifully finished and lit, with a full-size stand-up shower, sink and electric flush toilet

Ø Head further aft and you will find the Master Cabin with a Super-King bed, lots of lovely natural light, storage, and a large flat screen TV

Ø The master has an ensuite, beautifully finished, with sink, electric flush toilet, small bath and rainfall shower - ensuite bathrooms also have Corianna sinks and tops

Temptation Deck Area

Ø Teak decking throughout the exterior of the boat

Ø Wooden rubbing strake with stainless steel strip surrounds the vessel

Ø Bow fender storage on port and starboard sides

Ø Large stainless steel bow rails and cleats throughout

Ø Electric anchor windlass

Ø Forward bow bench style seating

Ø Good size pulpit with tall stanchions and well-maintained teak cap rail giving a beautiful look. Spacious side decks with good width and headroom

Ø Sliding doors (windbreakers) to the back deck on the port and starboard side decks

Ø Access to the bridge via a door on both port and starboard sides

Ø Starboard side boarding section with stainless tread plates. Boarding steps secure on the starboard side with canvas cover

Ø Steps to the flybridge via the Bridge

Temptation Flybridge Upper Deck

Ø Good size and safe steps give good access to the flybridge

Ø Lockable flybridge steps door

Ø Single Mivel helm seat

Ø Starboard side bench seat with cushions

Ø Renewed perspex windscreen surround

Ø Fantastic 360 view on the flybridge

Ø A real head turner with the 4-seater Hot Tub with lights and water jets, situated perfectly on the flybridge with spectacular views to the stern

Ø Subtle blue lighting on the flybridge for night-time use

Ø Hot and cold shower on the Flybridge

Ø Stainless steel radar arch

Ø Towards the aft of the flybridge is the Electronically controlled tender crane

Ø Safety chain at the edge of the flybridge with rails

Ø Good storage space on the flybridge with starboard side locker, bench seat storage and a very large storage space beneath the helm station Back deck

Ø Beautiful teak decking in the back deck is a highlight. All the decking has been replaced and can look like this the back deck was just sanded recently

Ø Large extendable dining table with 4 x chairs

Ø Good size safety rails surround the back deck with beautiful wooden handrails. Lighting throughout makes it the most sociable space to be in during an evening

Ø Access to the saloon through the large double sliding doors Transom

Ø Large transom with decked swim platform with stainless rails and stainless-steel ladder to the back deck

Ø Transom shower located behind the ladder leading up to the back deck from the swim platform

Classic Yacht Nadine Tariff & Supplementary Information

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The true story of Wolf Of Wall Street’s yacht ‘Nadine’

Jordan Belfort’s antics are so legendary that sinking a multi-million dollar yacht is just another act of depravity that Martin Scorsese manages to weave among The The wolf of Wall Street grotesque film adaptation. Those who know the wolf of Wall Street book will have read Belfort’s account about it in more detail, but the backstory of the superyacht Nadine is a lesser-known tale with unexpected twists.

Despite Jordan’s notoriety for unbridled bacchanalia, Nadine was sunk by natural forces far greater than even the fiercest drinking bout he could muster. In the middle of a pedestrianized Mediterranean cruise, a storm unexpectedly turned into a raging storm with high winds and huge swells to send the pride and joy of the wolf into Davey Jones’ locker.

In fact, this type of storm is so specific that it has its own name. The mistrals get their name from the winds that blow from the French Alps into the Mediterranean. This convection cycle is caused by warm air rising from African deserts and colder air from the Alps rushing through the void for sustained round trips of 12 to 40 hours. Nothing like a strong relentless wind to generate a dangerous swell. And the kicker? Mistrals are difficult to predict.

RELATED: Asymmetric superyacht hits market for $ 47 million

En route from Riva de Travino to the island of Sardinia, off the west coast of Italy, what should have been a routine race (which usually takes around 7 hours) ended in the fiasco that International Yachts described as ‘Mayday in the Med.’

â€œWhen we set off,â€ said Captain Mark Elliot, â€œthe forecast told us to expect wind and choppy but small seas. Knowing that this wouldn’t be an ideal crossing, the captain asked if the guests wanted to delay until the next morning. The answer was a definite ‘no’ as they were all eager to head to Sardinia for a round of golf the next morning. So, they cast off and set sail for another corner of paradise.

Hours later, the guests were enjoying the sunny afternoon weather of another dream day in the Mediterraneanâ€¦ when a rogue wave reached the bow and wheelhouse, inundating a hostess from head to toe. Immediately after this warning sign made contact, a transmission was received via radio warning of unexpected gale force winds in the area. The mistral had announced. The swell heights doubled, the winds intensified, and the shit became real.

However, before Belfort throws next-level parties aboard his elegant ship and charters it across the Mediterranean to Sardinia on that fateful day, Nadine had already lived many lives. In truth, the luxury yacht seen in The Wolf of Wall Street movie bears no resemblance to the period ship owned by Jordan Belfort. Scorsese hired a yacht called Lady M for these stages, which was originally built by Intermarine Savannah in 2002.

On the other hand, the real one Nadine (Where Mathilde as it was originally called), was built in 1961 and delivered by the Dutch shipyard Witsen & Vis for none other than fashion mogul Coco Chanel. At the time, Mathilde had five dark teak cabins, exceptional dining rooms and a helipad.

â€œAt that time, it was the largest yacht on the East Coast,â€ recalls Captain Mark Elliot. “No one had ever seen anything like it.”

After Coco’s death in 1971 the yacht was renamed Jan Pamela by its new owner, Melvin Lane Powers. While not as decorated as his predecessor, Powers was a notorious and ostentatious Houston real estate developer known for wearing crocodile skin boots and driving a golden Cadillac after being acquitted of the murder of her lover’s husband. The New York Times described his 1966 trial as “one of the most spectacular homicide trials of all time.”

Powers ordered a huge refit and extension of the ship, but in 1983 it hit rock bottom and Jan Pamela was sold before being renamed Waterside . In 1989, it was Bernie Little’s luck, and he bought her sight without seeing her. She then underwent another refit, before becoming Great eagle under the command of Mark Elliot once again. In this form, she caught the attention of Jordan Belfort, who took possession of it in 1995. Of course, he had to undertake his own additions and renovations, before renaming the ship after his second wife, Nadine .

However, the reincarnation of this historic yacht as Nadine was to be short lived. After 35 years of leisure, sailing on the most beautiful coasts and welcoming the great names of the time, Mother Nature would have the last word.

Back in the Mediterranean, hours later, roaring gusts ripped the $ 100,000 tender from its tow lines. Captain Mark Elliot calls to abandon yacht, as turning point Nadine against the crashing waves would have courted disaster. Abandoning the course to try to outrun the mistral was out of the question for the same reasons. They are there now – every captain’s nightmare – with seventy knot winds and 35 foot ridges to negotiate.

Then, Nadine’s The moment of “perfect storm” pointed its formidable head. The huge wave crashes all over the ship, tearing off the hatches and deck fittings, triggering a death knell that can only end with a day of disaster. The remaining supply crashes into the dining room window, causing it to collapse wave after wave flooding the living room.

“I knew at that time that Nadine had received a fatal blow. Once I assessed the damage, I walked over to the deck and used the satellite phone to contact the Italian Coast Guard known as â€œGruppo Marine Italian,â€ says Captain Elliot.

First aid stations. Guests are gathered in a secure central location and escorted one by one to their cabins to collect passports and any valuables that can fit in a small bag.

Half an hour later, a rescue helicopter attempts to bring down a diver to pick up guests. However, the gusts of wind turned out to be too violent, and after almost losing the said diver, the helicopter aborted. Imagine the heartbreaking feeling of those on board Nadine , as the Coast Guard abandon ship, defeated by the rampaging elements, and return to the safety of the coast as the sun sets below the horizon and night sets in.

Hurricane-force winds, severe flooding and a 15-meter-high sea are now pounding Italy’s shores in what will be known as the storm of the century. The situation is so tumultuous that when a large merchant ship attempts another rescue attempt a few hours later, it almost crashes in Nadine , before setting off again and again, abandoning the crew and the frenzied guests.

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The liferafts are deployed as a precautionâ€¦ until the roaring wind also tears them from the sea, leaving the crew completely stranded on board.

Below deck, the flooded kitchen has become an electrified death trap, and the chef and engineer receive jolts from the current before pulling the ass out of there to the (relative) safety above. It should be noted that this is probably around the time when a deranged and drenched Leo shouts at Jonah Hill with the unforgettable line: “Get the ludes downstairs!” I will not die sober! To have. The. Whore. Ludes! ”

Times of crisis. With no options left, Captain Elliot calls to throw the helicopter off the bridge to free up space for another rescue attempt. He unhooks the tie-downs and rolls the ship twenty degrees, throwing the expensive equipment overboard and into the Mediterranean, where its rusty skeleton undoubtedly lies to this day.

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At around 5 a.m., the Coast Guard returned and began to hoist the guests, then the crew to safety in the reassuring light of dawn. The weather calmed down as the winds and waves calmed down, but the damage was done. The last to leave the ship he commanded for so many years, Mark Elliot takes stock of the wreck before finally accepting his loss, closing the engine room controls and seizing the buoy rescue package handed to him by the coast guard.

Nadine is swallowed up by the sea, just ten minutes after Captain Elliot left his decks.

While all the guests and the crew of 11 survive, the prestigious motor yacht and its collection of toys (including eight jet skis, four motorcycles, snorkeling gear, a helicopter and a seaplane) sink into the deep end. at the bottom of the Mediterranean, over 1000 m deep. the water.

â€œThe insurance paid off immediately because it was the storm of the century,â€ said Captain Elliot.

Back on dry land, Mark Elliot was hailed as a hero after showing courage and leadership in such a dire situation. He was then offered command of Bernie Little’s famous yacht Vessel , and today works as a broker in Miami as one of the most experienced and capable men in the business.

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Mystery surrounds sunken, dismantled luxury yacht with no confirmed owner

A man in a white shirt stands with a woman in a yellow swimsuit on a boat.

The luxury pleasure cruiser started taking on water on a weeknight in May, with just the caretaker on board.

Unregistered and unable to berth at the nearby marina, it had been anchored off the coast of Yeppoon in Queensland.

But the superyacht had dragged its anchor in the rough weather, and was heading towards the rocky shore south of Lammermoor Beach.

As it drifted and sank into the ocean, maritime crews rescued the caretaker and towed the million-dollar yacht to safer waters.

The mystery superyacht creating a logistical nightmare for authorities was shrouded by a chequered past.

As it ran aground, baffled Yeppoon locals watched salvagers cut the marooned vessel into pieces, as debris washed up on the pristine coastline.

Four images showing a luxury yacht in the stages of being dismantled.

No-one came forward to claim ownership of the boat.

But accusations were quick to fly.

"This couldn't happen to a nicer person," boat captain Richie Cunningham told his Facebook followers in a video from Lammermoor Beach, with the partially submerged superyacht in the frame behind him.

"This is karma at work."

The former owner banned from business

The swipe was at Gold Coast identity Jamie McIntyre, a banned businessman previously known for hosting lavish parties in Surfers Paradise.

In 2016, a Federal Court judge banned Mr McIntyre from managing corporations for 10 years, after he was found to have run five unlawful managed investment schemes, which cost 152 investors $7 million.

Mr McIntyre has been tied to the sunken superyacht, but strongly denies that he is its current owner.

A man in an Akubra-style hat sits next to a couple on a boat.

"It was owned by a boat syndicate," Mr McIntyre told ABC Capricornia in a text, "mostly overseas owners who don't live in Australia."

Mr McIntyre said he had plans to buy the boat as "a wedding present".

"I used to own it and was buying it back as shareholders wanted it sold, once its commercial survey for charter was complete."

The influencer, the 'Colombian playboy', and the international syndicates

Mr McIntyre married Brisbane influencer and "entrepreneur" Nadine Roberts in May.

Ms Roberts' Instagram feed lists a press pass picturing her as a "journalist" for an anti-vax website. Both have appeared as speakers and performers at anti-vaccination rallies.

Two days before the superyacht sank, a company called Boat Syndicate was registered in Ms Roberts' name.

The company's co-director is listed as Alejandro Mendieta Blanco, a luxury goods buyer and self-described "Colombian playboy", who was jailed in 2020 for receiving stolen gold jewellery and a Louis Vuitton handbag.

A man smiles as he holds a champagne bottle.

Neither Ms Roberts nor Mr Mendieta Blanco have responded to requests for comment.

But Mr McIntyre denies Boat Syndicate is the yacht's owner.

"Boat Syndicate was a company set up to buy it, but as it sunk [the] sale obviously can't go through," Mr McIntyre said in a text to the ABC.

Another syndicate listed on the Australian Securities and Investments Commission lists Ms Roberts and Mr Mendieta Blanco as shareholders, with Ms Roberts listed as secretary and director.

Known as Boat Swap Syndicate, that company was deregistered in February.

Another of the former Boat Swap Syndicate shareholders, a Turkey-based financial planner, confirmed the syndicate used to own the sunken yacht.

Mr McIntyre did not respond when asked about that syndicate, and has refused to clarify who the current owner is.

"I spoke to some of the shareholders," Mr McIntyre said.

"They said they have no interest in speaking to 'fake journos who works [sic] for mainstream media outlets like the ABC'.

"It must be a very slow news year in Rockhampton," Mr McIntyre said.

"You don't need to speak to anyone … you need to get a life."

The party boat

Boat captain Richie Cunningham said he skippered for Mr McIntyre a decade ago, when he hosted luxury cruises along the Gold Coast with a boat known as Livin' I.

"I guess the standard operating procedure was party mode," Mr Cunningham said about the time he worked for Mr McIntyre.

"There were plenty of young bikini-clad partygoers, and Jamie and his friends, having a great time.

"And that's all wonderful. But where I drew the line was overloading the vessel."

Mr Cunningham said he quit over alleged safety concerns.

"It's just not viable to have 30 or 40 people trying to clamber all over a 58-foot sports cruiser."

Mr McIntyre claims Mr Cunningham was sacked and his comment on Facebook was motivated by this.

"He can barely write, let alone count, more bulls**t from a sacked skipper," Mr McIntryre said.

Mr Cunningham said he understood the sunken boat to be called Livin' II and that it was not the first time it had been in trouble.

"It's very well known, particularly on the Gold Coast, as a vessel that had previously jammed itself under Sundale Bridge, and then was towed out very unceremoniously."

Mr McIntyre responded, saying that the yacht was "illegally used by a boat manager and stand-in skipper for illegal charters without the owner's permission and crashed into a bridge".

"It's also run aground before on the Gold Coast near what's known as Bum's Bay just north of Sea World," Mr Cunningham said.

Mr McIntyre has a history of complex company structures and directorships which makes it difficult to track who owned the boat.

But the ABC understands Livin' II had previously been operating as a pleasure cruiser for Gold Coast Luxury Escapes, to which Ms Roberts is listed as a company director.

Mr McIntyre's former bookkeeper's husband was also listed as a director.

The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) reported a previous company linked to Mr McIntyre was fined $20,000 in the Southport Magistrates Court in 2020 for hiring out the boat without a certificate of operation or a certificate of survey.

At the time, AMSA said authorities were alerted to the operation "after a paying passenger died from a medical condition during a cruise on December 31, 2018".

The ABC is not implying that Mr McIntyre was implicated in the death.

The owner of a marina in south-east Queensland, who wished to remain anonymous, said he kicked the boat out of his marina after witnessing unauthorised charters.

He said he almost got into a "punch on" with a DJ after "a busload of girls rocked up for a party" on the boat and that he told Mr McIntyre he had to leave his marina immediately.

The 'dark web of shipping'

Maritime Safety Queensland (MSQ) would not respond to specific questions from the ABC about the sunken yacht's registration, insurance or ownership.

In a statement, MSQ general manager Kell Dillon said it was still investigating, in conjunction with AMSA.

"Owners are always responsible for maintaining their vessels or removing them from Queensland waters where they become unseaworthy," Mr Dillon said.

"MSQ has options to seize vessels and remove them as well as to recover costs where practicable through the courts."

Mr McIntyre said there had been "a commercial-in-confidence deal done with the Queensland government" to recover costs, but MSQ has not confirmed this.

Queensland Police said that, at this stage, it was not involved in the investigation, as that was MSQ's jurisdiction.

AMSA said it was "assisting Maritime Safety Queensland with ongoing enquiries".

If the boat is owned by an international syndicate, it's very difficult for the public to ascertain that information.

Ian Bray — the national coordinator for the International Transport Workers Federation — said ownership of international boats in Australia waters was incredibly murky.

Mr Bray said that, often, boats were registered under shell companies in tax havens, making it difficult for authorities to know who actually owned them and was responsible for them.

"It's completely unregulated," Mr Bray said.

"It's really the other dark web — the dark web of shipping.

"It's a global issue that governments need to start to pay attention to.

"When you consider that 90 per cent of the world's activity regarding trade is dependent on shipping, I think it's in everybody's interest that they do pay further attention to it."

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'Frustrated': Authorities begin clean-up of sunken luxury yacht after owner fails to show

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Jordan Belfort Yacht: The True Story and The Wolf of Wall Street Version

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The true Jordan Belfort yacht story is as strange and unbelievable as the hit movie The Wolf of Wall Street depicts it to be. There are several insider stories behind the sinking of the mighty yacht that are not widely known but are quite interesting and different from the reel version in several ways.

Nadine yacht model

What happened to the Jordan Belfort yacht Nadine? As the movie, The Wolf of Wall Street shows, the superyacht Nadine sank close to the coast of Sardinia in 1997 while battling what many calls “the storm of the century”. Jordan Belfort narrates the event in detail in the memoir describing his life in the 90s, which is what the Martin Scorsese movie is about.

Jordan belfort yacht sailing

Did the yacht scene in The Wolf of Wall Street actually happen? The Jordan Belfort yacht sinking scene in The Wolf of Wall Street was heavily inspired by a real-life event, though the movie did take some creative liberties. For one, the yacht was called Naomi in the reel version since the name of Belfort’s wife (played by Margot Robbie) was changed in the movie. In reality, the yacht was named Nadine.

Interesting insights on the sinking as portrayed in the movie

The movie captured each passenger’s fear and stress when the yacht got caught up in the 70-knot storm. There is some hilarity when Belfort starts yelling for his drugs to avoid the horror of dying sober. Several rescue attempts were made, but each was called off due to rising risks. By some twist of luck, the yacht’s engine room remained undamaged primarily for a while, because of which they were able to make their way through the sea.

The best features of the Jordan Belfort yacht Nadine

The 167 ft Nadine, as its former passengers claim, was beautiful. When owned by Coco Chanel under the name Matilda, the yacht had five staterooms, large dining areas, and a helipad. The interiors were furnished with dark teak paneling. Each new owner customized the yacht’s name and interiors based on their tastes.

Which model was portrayed as the Jordan Belfort yacht Nadine in the movie?

Martin Scorsese got the yacht Lady M to represent Nadine onscreen. While Nadine had a luxuriously vintage charm, Lady M is a modern vessel with contemporary features. Lady M was manufactured in 2022 by Intermarine Savannah, while Nadine was built in 1961 by Witsen & Wis. The 147 ft Lady M is currently worth $12 million and is similar to Benetti yachts in its glamorous design.

Jordan Belfort’s life today

The entrepreneur and speaker Jordan Belfort’s shenanigans are well-known thanks to his detailed memoir and the hit movie based on some parts of his life. He spent 2 years in prison and now has practically negative net worth at 59 years of age. Yet, his extraordinary motivational speaking skills continue to attract and inspire people even today. It is easy for anyone watching the movie to wonder if many of the incidents are exaggerated. But considering Belfort’s eccentric life, even the Nadine sinking incident remains another regular anecdote shared in the movie.

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Improving the odds of recovery

For the most part, the average voyaging crew stands a low chance of recovering a crewmember who goes overboard. Not for lack of effort, but simply because the process requires planning and practice. This study of the topic is a good first-step, but we can’t stop here — we must also prepare and improve our skill on the water!

I’ve not lost anyone to the sea in my 37 years of active sailing, having sailed with thousands of crew in calm to stormy conditions; yet, I’ve twice been an overboard victim, and acted as captain recovering four victims on separate occasions.

After analyzing actual accounts of man-overboard (MOB) recoveries (not simulations), it seems clear that each recovery rarely traces the steps of accepted recovery methods. Quite often actual recoveries require a blend of sailing skill best learned by practicing all methods.

“Don’t let go,” is the best advice I can give an overboard victim. In the end, it’s the victim who matters most — the victim could care less whether his crew’s reaction follows a method to the “T.” Windward pickup, leeward pickup, sugar scoop ladder? The victim just wants to re-board, and they’ll swim for it if they can. If justification was ever needed for one human to be critical of another it’s given to the overboard victim watching an average crew sail-off for X boat-lengths on a specified point of sail, and… fail to recover him on their first attempt.

Unfortunately a single proper procedure doesn’t exist for every situation. Sailing conditions vary and yacht designs vary; and a specific recovery maneuver may be chosen over another to suit a particular yacht under the prevailing conditions. The recovery crew simply must have strong boat-handling skills in diverse sea-states and wind conditions to raise their odds for success, and it’s beneficial to also have experience with a variety of yacht designs to draw upon while recovering a victim who’s fallen overboard from an unfamiliar yacht, like a charter.

Four recovery methods The 2005 Crew Overboard Rescue Symposium (Aug. 9-12, 2005; San Francisco Bay, Calif.) led practical on-the-water testing of overboard rescue gear and methods; likely the most extensive investigation of its kind to date. In addition to a final report by John Rousmaniere (June 26, 2006) compiling the symposium’s findings, the symposium also produced heightened sailing skills in its participants via on-the-water exercises undertaken during the study; the sort of hands-on practice average crews should also pursue aboard their own yachts or via custom professional instruction.

Four recovery methods for mono-hulled sailing yachts using basic sailing skills were highlighted during the symposium: Turning Maneuvers: Quick Stop and Fast Return; and Point-of-Sail Maneuvers: Figure 8 and Deep Beam Reach. These are sound methods, but even an expert sailor will need to study and digest them before beginning on-the-water practice; the average sailor will require significant study and practice to attain the skills necessary for success. In documenting the four maneuvers, Rousmaniere (2006:13) states:

• Quick Stop: Luff into the wind immediately, then make one or more elliptical loops around the victim. To slow the boat and avoid distraction by sheets, trim the sails flat (with the jib left trimmed to one side), or furl the jib. When the crew and gear are ready, head to the victim on a close reach. (This maneuver is also used in Lifesling rescues.)

• Fast Return: If sailing upwind, bear off, and after about two and a half boat lengths, tack, back the jib, bear off, and head up to the victim on a close reach. If sailing downwind, head up, and after about two and a half lengths, tack and head to the victim.

• Figure 8: Alter course to a beam reach, and after about five boat lengths tack, bear off, and return on a close reach.

• Deep Beam Reach: Bear off to just below a beam reach, and after two boat lengths tack and come back to the victim on a close reach.

Reattachment vs. recovery Overboard recovery efforts can be broken into two phases: 1) reattaching the victim to the vessel; and, 2) recovering the victim from the water and placing them aboard the vessel. Ultimately, the victim’s reattachment to the vessel is the first major accomplishment in the process.

Most overboard victims remain conscious and retain some mobility in the water; and, given their pressing circumstances can muster the fight to reattach themselves to the vessel if nearby.

The victim’s submersed mobility will be hindered by their saturated clothing and cumbersomeness of their harness and PFD. Cold water will also zap their energy. Despite these obvious shortcomings, the conscious victim should be considered part of the solution.

Without adamantly favoring one approach over another, a good first course of action to reattach the victim is… immediately deploy the Lifesling as quickly as the victim goes overboard (whether it gets directly to the victim or not). Every offshore yacht should carry a Lifesling that’s fully commissioned on the stern pulpit. A conscious victim can swim a short distance and grab ahold of the floating Lifesling harness to reattach via its direct-tether to the yacht. Meanwhile, the crew will carry-out the Quick Stop maneuver. The procedural tack should be completed before all the slack is pulled-out of the Lifesling’s tether to avoid dragging the victim behind the moving yacht. A yacht sailing at 6.5 knots must complete the tack in 13.6 seconds before reaching the end of the 150-foot tether. Even if the yacht misses the conscious victim on the first pass, the Lifesling’s tether should be drawn within the victim’s reach in the process of circling them. These actions are proven to recover actual victims.

Other formal recovery maneuvers exist; although, the Lifesling Quick Stop (described above) is generally preferred by victims because it is reassuring for the vessel to remain close by, and it offers better odds to maintain visual contact with the victim than any other maneuver. Mostly, the Lifesling Quick Stop offers the victim the option to save themselves, where other sailing-based methods do not. It is the method I stress during the Modern Geographic Sailing Expeditions I lead aboard my boat Solstice . However, factors contrary to these points obviously exist, namely that considerations for how a vessel performs in different wind and sea-state conditions should be made before a yacht’s crew decides which “primary response” method works best in a particular case. Inherent design characteristics of a vessel make maneuvering more or less favorable in specific conditions — we’ll discuss boat-handling practice and other maneuvers later in this article.

The victim also has responsibilities! If conscious, he or she must not let go — they must fight to survive. A victim’s passive approach does not help the crew’s recovery efforts. They should attempt to make contact with whatever debris the crew has thrown to them, preferably the floating Lifesling harness! They should remain in contact with the recovery crew by several means: make repeatable sound from a whistle; raise arms and tread high in the water to be more visible behind waves; and, monitor their exertion-level to sustain these activities throughout the recovery process, giving maximum effort when it counts most.

The conscious victim should even contribute to the rescue by communicating by voice, if possible. Or, illuminate a light-stick; activate personal electronic devices; or even communicate via a waterproof hand-held VHF radio. A consciously-passive victim is as unhelpful as an unconscious one. Recovery odds will be heightened if the conscious victim contributes.

Recovery: re-boarding the victim Getting the victim safely back aboard the yacht is the pinnacle of success. Again, the Lifesling is a good option and my preferred tool for overboard recovery, serving a dual-function of reattaching and raising the victim from the water to the deck. Conscious or not, the victim can be hoisted from the water by positioning the Lifesling’s harness under the victim’s armpits and around their backside. Two stainless D-rings sewn onto the Lifesling serve to attach hoisting tackle. A conscious victim would have already wrapped the Lifesling around him or herself during the reattachment phase; but the unconscious overboard victim must receive total assistance to don the Lifesling, or any other lifting harness for that matter.

Re-boarding the unconscious victim is the most difficult type of recovery. A crew’s precise yacht-maneuvering to the victim’s location is absolutely necessary. More important, the yacht must stop and remain stopped at the victim’s location before getting them aboard. Few victims will remain attached to the vessel if the yacht has way on; and, an unconscious victim will likely require a tethered crewmember to get into the water to attach the Lifesling or lifting harness. Telescoping boat hooks provide assistance in making contact with the victim, but again, if the yacht has way, the boat hook could be ripped from the rescuer’s grip, and lost.

Any yacht with way will intensify the difficulty of getting the victim aboard. If the sea-state is choppy (an offshore significant wave height of three feet, for example) the recovery effort will suffer considerable difficulty. Rescue via a sugar-scoop transom in average ocean chop will likely cause the victim to be smashed by a yacht’s trailing undersides (the ends of a yacht can be the worst location to mount the re-boarding efforts in waves). The rescuer’s best hope for an easy full recovery is for the victim to somehow be “fitted” with a hoisting-harness, where hoisting-tackle can quickly be attached via a snap-shackle, and to begin hoisting the victim from the water via winch or tackle. If two rescuers can each get a grip under the victim’s arms and pull him aboard the yacht, great, but the yacht’s lifeline gates should be positioned next to the victim, further adding to the precision required in maneuvering the yacht. Even if the victim can be plucked from the sea by two strong rescuers, there should be a hoisting-harness and tackle at the ready.

Boat-handling practice and onboard preparation An ill-suited and common practice-exercise to simulate an overboard victim’s recovery (assuming the worst-case unconscious victim) is to toss overboard a fender or throwable Type IV life jacket. This type of object drifts passively along with the wind. Then we pick it up using a boat hook, to haul it back aboard with minimal effort. Even with the yacht underway, the crew can pluck the object from the sea without too much difficulty. This exercise should not be considered MOB recovery practice; it is a maneuvering exercise — an undertaking which marginally improves the odds of recovering an actual overboard person… why? Because: 1) the target can drift more rapidly with the wind than a victim would, affectively teaching us to over-judge our real-life maneuvering response; 2) the target’s full recovery can be made using a boat hook without completely stopping the yacht; 3) the recovery crew never uses a hoisting tackle; 4) the recovery crew never had to connect a lifting harness to any victim; and, 5) the recovery crew never entered the water to prepare for an unconscious victim’s recovery; nor practiced hauling a 200-plus pound victim aboard by any means.

What’s perhaps the most disappointing results of the above ill-suited and common MOB practice-exercise is the social conditioning that forms our assumption that every victim’s involvement is passive. I believe this develops a false sense of accomplishment in a crew’s ability to rescue an actual MOB.

Even amongst expert instructors of MOB recovery, there are many variations within the formal methods taught. The obvious explanation for procedural variations must come down to nuances of boat-handling, affected by the prevailing conditions and particular vessel’s design. For example, some instructors of the Quick Stop say you should ease-out the mainsail upon completing the tack, and others say you shouldn’t… the correct answer is obviously the one that recovers the victim under the prevailing conditions, which depends upon the sea-state, wind strength, and the yacht’s maneuverability in those conditions. In addition, fin-keeled and full-keeled mono-hulled yachts will have different turning radii, coasting and slippage characteristics; and every yacht will certainly have different rigging layouts and MOB recovery gear. We may create specific MOB procedures for individual crew and yachts, but it’s the recovery action in atypical situations that saves lives.

Planning, practice, evaluation, and modification of every yacht’s MOB recovery method and equipment should be carried out on a frequent basis — at a minimum each time a new crewmember goes out sailing. Regular crews should undergo this investigation and practice several times per year. Cross-training of roles is a good idea too. On the water practice must include provisions for a full recovery, from reattachment to re-boarding before truly improving one’s odds of recovery. A yacht’s skipper should prepare a complete MOB recovery methodology for the crew, and a cohesive collection of recovery equipment that can be tested and evaluated while on the water. MOB recovery practice should be performed in a variety of wind and sea-state conditions. All MOB recovery maneuvers should be evaluated, including the use of auxiliary engine propulsion (motor-sailing) and purely as a motor vessel.

Final words to improve recovery odds: It’s the owner or captain’s responsibility to ultimately decide upon the preferred MOB recovery method for the yacht, and communicate and practice it with the crew. Involve the crew in evaluating the methods. The particular yacht’s handling characteristics must be understood before deciding upon the best first recovery response. An exceptional captain and crew will have developed innate skill in maneuvering their yacht through a lot of practice. The crew’s actions must teeter between common sense and memorized routine, for written procedures are often stuffed in a folder below and the crew must act decisively and exceptionally to save their fellow crew.

Regarding the specific argument about how much boat speed a vessel should have at the point where the victim comes alongside the vessel, there exists much unsupported misinformation from the sailing community about acceptable boat speed limits. In my experience and opinion, a stopped vessel is nearly the only way to recover a victim from the water in average ocean conditions, for the rolling, pitching, heaving and yawing motion of the yacht is already a considerable amount of movement. A crew that possesses “exceptional” boat-handling skills means the crews abilities can effectively negotiate the vessel between 0 to 1 knot of boat speed in a wide variety of conditions while precisely positioning the vessel alongside the victim when, where, and how they wish! The vessel must be held stable long enough for the victim to re-board the vessel via hoisting tackle or any other acceptable means. Some boating deaths have been caused by dragging the victim through the water because the vessel was not slowed to an adequate speed or stopped.

The need for high-precision maneuvering that brings the victim along-side the vessel, combined with the reality that crews don’t practice MOB recovery often enough to drill that level of maneuvering, serves as my impetus for recommending the Lifesling Quick Stop as an inexpensive and relatively easy-to-implement recovery method. If we take the time to investigate and improve our MOB recovery options, select and practice a preferred maneuver, and commission a Lifesling on our vessel… we’ve just increased our odds tenfold — I’m certain every sailor would appreciate being the beneficiary of those odds.

———- Paul Exner is a Coast Guard licensed captain and the owner of Modern Geographic Sailing Expeditions ( www.moderngeographic.com ).

By Ocean Navigator

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NADINE Interior & Exterior Photos

50.5m / 165'8 | witsen & vis | 1963.

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Jordan Belfort’s ex-wife tells the real story behind the yacht on The Wolf of Wall Street

The ex-wife of jordan belfort shed some light on the infamous scene.

Ben Thompson

Jordan Belfort's ex wife, Nadine Macaluso, has set the record straight about the scene in The Wolf Of Wall Street where Belfort splashes out and buys his wife a yacht on their wedding day.

I mean, when you have a lot of money , what better way to treat your new spouse after saying I do?

After their lavish wedding, Belford ( Leonardo DiCaprio ) covers Nadine's, or Naomi as she's known in the movie, eyes with a blindfold before revealing the huge yacht, which has been christened the 'Naomi'.

And Naomi (played by Margot Robbie ) cannot contain her excitement.

"Are you serious? A f***ing yacht?!" she exclaims.

However, it seems that the real Belfort wasn't very serious, as Macaluso revealed on TikTok that her ex-husband, who she was married to from 1991 to 2005, 'did not' actually buy her a boat on their wedding day.

Margot Robbie played Naomi, who was based on Nadine.

She said: "Actually what happened I think we were married for a few years and we were always chartering yachts, because he loved to do that.

"And I had given birth to my beautiful daughter Chandler and he said 'I want to buy a yacht'."

However, this idea didn't sit well with Macaluso at the time.

She continued: "I said 'I don't think we should buy a yacht, we have a baby and I don't feel comfortable.

'She can't swim.'

"I had visions of her falling off the boat and I was actually terrified.

"I did not want to buy the yacht ironically. And he was like 'Nope, I'm buying a yacht and I'm calling it the Nadine'. And I was like 'Okay, here we go'.

"And you know how that went."

Nadine Macaluso opened up about the real life story of the yacht on TikTok.

Macaluso's final line is a nod to a scene in the film, in which Belfort and Naomi need to be rescued from the yacht after it gets caught up in a storm.

This scene was indeed based on the real life sinking of the ship in June 1996, which resulted in a rescue by the Italian Navy Special forces.

The yacht was sunk after violent waves repeatedly hit it, but luckily everyone on board was able to escape the ship in time.

Belford didn't actually buy the yacht for his wife as a wedding gift.

Macaluso has previously commented on the scene's accuracy , where she admitted in a TikTok video that the yacht sinking scene was 'totally true'.

Speaking of the memory, she said: "It was horrific, horrifying, we were in a squall for 12 to 18 hours and we lived, thank god, for my kids."

She even showed real life footage of her, Belford and their friends being rescued by the Navy.

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Maine Man Sentenced To 12 Years in Prison for Role in Meth Conspiracy

BOSTON – A Maine man has been sentenced for his role in a methamphetamine trafficking conspiracy that operated in M assachusetts, New Hampshire and Northern California.

Jacob Parlin, 44, of Lebanon, Maine, was sentenced by U.S. District Court Judge Leo T. Sorokin to 12 years in prison and five years of supervised release. In November 2023, Parlin was convicted by a federal jury of one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and one count of distribution of and possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine.

Parlin was indicted along with nine others in December 2021 for their roles in a drug trafficking organization led by co-defendant Harry Tam, a/k/a “Legendary H.” The investigation identified Parlin as one of Tam’s trusted business partners with whom he worked together to distribute methamphetamine in Maine. In their business arrangement, Tam would procure methamphetamine from California or elsewhere via mailed shipments to his business in Brookline. The methamphetamine would then be transferred to Parlin for distribution in his community in Maine.

Parlin was arrested early in the morning of March 31, 2021 in New Hampshire, as he drove home to Maine from the Boston-area after meeting with Tam. A plastic bag containing approximately 880 grams of 100% pure methamphetamine was found beneath the driver’s seat of Parlin’s car. More than three kilograms of methamphetamine, about a dozen firearms and approximately $95,000 in cash was seized over the course of the investigation.

Parlin is the ninth defendant to be convicted in the case. Tam pleaded guilty in July 2023 and is scheduled to be sentenced on April 4, 2024.

Acting United States Attorney Joshua S. Levy and Brian D. Boyle, Special Agent in Charge of the Drug Enforcement Administration, New England Field Division made the announcement. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Nadine Pellegrini and Amanda Beck of the Criminal Division prosecuted the case.

This effort is part of an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) operation. OCDETF identifies, disrupts, and dismantles the highest-level criminal organizations that threaten the United States using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach. Additional information about the OCDETF Program can be found at https://www.justice.gov/OCDETF .

IMAGES

Nadine: The Incredible True Story Behind Wolf Of Wall Street's Yacht
Nadine: The Incredible True Story Behind Wolf Of Wall Street's Yacht
Nadine: The Incredible True Story Behind Wolf Of Wall Street's Yacht
NADINE Yacht Photos
La véritable histoire du yacht 'Nadine' de Wolf Of Wall Street
Nadine Yacht Sinking

COMMENTS

The story of the Wolf of Wall Street Jordan Belfort's 37m yacht Nadine
How Jordan Belfort's 37m superyacht Nadine sank off the coast of Sardinia. Coco Chanel was famously outspoken on many things, but yachting, in particular, attracted her ire. "As soon as you set foot on a yacht you belong to some man, not to yourself, and you die of boredom," she was once quoted as saying. Her solution was to buy her own yacht.
Mayday In The Med
The real story of the sinking of the Wolf of Wall Street's yacht. In 2000, Doug Hoogs interviewed Capt. Mark Elliott about the sinking of the motoryacht Nadine.Elliott was in command of Nadine on the fateful day in 1996 when she encountered a powerful mistral in the Mediterranean between the Italian mainland and Sardinia. All guests and crew survived, but the real story of the sinking, which ...
Any info on the yacht 'Nadine'
The Skipper of it when it sank is a well known and active character within the industry to this very day. I found this on another site. Nadine's sinking was indeed caused by the violent waves. A foredeck hatch was smashed, allowing water to flood the crew quarters and bringing the yacht down by the bow.
Nadine: The Incredible True Story Behind Wolf Of Wall Street's Yacht
Nadine is swallowed by the sea, just ten minutes after Captain Elliot departs her decks. While all guests and the crew of 11 survive, the prestigious motor yacht and her collection of toys (including eight jet skis, four motorbikes, diving equipment, a helicopter, and a seaplane) sink to the bottom of the Med in over 1,000 metres of water.
Yachtspotter.com
S/Y Legacy recovery is making great progress. ... About Nadine, the rescue was not easy because of the rough sea state and the presence of obstacles on the deck. ... (I'm terrible for dates... I guess at least 5 years ago or even more) the charter yacht named "Nadine" sank during a storm off the east coast of Sardinia carrying while on board ...
The Real Story Behind the Yacht in The Wolf of Wall Street
The Sinking of the Nadine Yacht. Nadine Caridi recently spoke about the sinking of the yacht in June 1996, an event that inspired a scene in the movie. The yacht's sinking during a storm off the coast of Italy was a terrifying experience for everyone on board. The waves were violent and relentless, hitting the yacht repeatedly.
Marine Investigation Report M90L3034
The Class II EPIRBs on the "NADINE" were not used. 1.10.5.2 Recovery of EPIRBs. On 17 December 1990, the Class I EPIRB of the "NADINE" was recovered in position 47°33′N, 61°24′W. Neither the name of the vessel nor the service date appeared on the transmitter. However, the date of the most recent battery change was indicated.
Nadine Yacht 1996
NADINE YACHT 1996, wreck, wreck database. This is a thumbnail version of the chart Capo Circeo to Punta Falcone.You do not have sufficient rights to see this chart in full resolution [8652x5884 pixels].
NADINE Yacht Charter Brochure
Download the full charter brochure for luxury Motor Yacht "NADINE" to explore her beautiful interiors, guest accommodation and full range of amenities as well as outdoor living spaces. This comprehensive overview provides the best way to get a feel for the charter experience on offer and gives detailed and accurate specifications so that you can match them up to your own requirements.
Classic Yacht Nadine, Yacht in Hampshire, Sleeps 4
Classic Yacht Nadine is a Shepards Motor Yacht that has been restored and upgraded over the last five years. She was custom built at a purchase cost of over £6 million (in current value) and finished to European Specifications by Trojan Yachts situated by Niagara Falls in Canada. She was bought down the St. Lawrence waterways to New York where ...
The true story of Wolf Of Wall Street's yacht 'Nadine'
Back in the Mediterranean, hours later, roaring gusts ripped the $ 100,000 tender from its tow lines. Captain Mark Elliot calls to abandon yacht, as turning point Nadine against the crashing waves would have courted disaster. Abandoning the course to try to outrun the mistral was out of the question for the same reasons.
NADINE Yacht
The 50.5m/165'8" motor yacht 'Nadine' (ex. Mathilde) was built by Witsen & Vis. Guest Accommodation. Nadine has been designed to comfortably accommodate up to 10 guests in 5 suites. Range & Performance. Nadine is built with a steel hull and steel superstructure, with teak decks. Her low draft of 2m/6'7" makes her primed for accessing shallow ...
Mystery surrounds sunken, dismantled luxury yacht with no confirmed
Mr McIntyre has been tied to the sunken superyacht, but strongly denies that he is its current owner. Mr McIntyre with Ms Roberts (together, right). (Facebook) "It was owned by a boat syndicate ...
LA NADINE Yacht
The 28.96m/95' motor yacht 'La Nadine' was built by Whiteman. Guest Accommodation. She is also capable of carrying up to 5 crew onboard to ensure a relaxed luxury yacht experience. Range & Performance. La Nadine is built with a aluminium hull and aluminium superstructure, with teak decks. Powered by twin diesel GM (12V71TI) engines, she ...
The True Jordan Belfort Yacht Story: Fact vs. Fiction
The Jordan Belfort yacht sinking scene in The Wolf of Wall Street was heavily inspired by a real-life event, though the movie did take some creative liberties. For one, the yacht was called Naomi in the reel version since the name of Belfort's wife (played by Margot Robbie) was changed in the movie. In reality, the yacht was named Nadine.
Losses german aviation 1914
Hi I am searching added information about losses german aviation on Russian front in the 1914. I only knew that 14.08.1914 west Simno 1 aircraft shot down 4 KIA 03.09.1914 near Zvolen 1 aircraft shot down 2 POW 07.09.1914 near Zamostya 1 aircraft shot down 02.10.1914 FFA 17 1 aircraft shot down 03.10.1914 FFA 35 1 aircraft shot down 10.10.1914 FFA 31 1 aircraft shot down 27.10.1914 1 balloon ...
Improving the odds of recovery
Overboard recovery efforts can be broken into two phases: 1) reattaching the victim to the vessel; and, 2) recovering the victim from the water and placing them aboard the vessel. Ultimately, the victim's reattachment to the vessel is the first major accomplishment in the process. Getting the victim back aboard.
Nadine Abrahams on owning 40m Maiora superyacht Always Believe
SYT speaks to superyacht owner Nadine Abrahams about how she fell in love with her Maiora yacht Always Believe. See more. Owner Experience Nadine Abrahams on owning 40m Maiora superyacht Always Believe. Written by Georgia Tindale. 26 Nov 2020 | 14:00. Loading... Newsletter. Subscribe.
NADINE Yacht Photos
We combine thousands of yacht listings with local destination information, sample itineraries and experiences to deliver the world's most comprehensive yacht charter website. London. +44 20 8004 0342. San Francisco. Interior & exterior photos of NADINE, the 51m Witsen & Vis super yacht.
Jordan Belfort's ex-wife tells the real story behind the yacht on The
The ex-wife of Jordan Belfort shed some light on the infamous scene. Jordan Belfort's ex wife, Nadine Macaluso, has set the record straight about the scene in The Wolf Of Wall Street where Belfort ...
Leisure Boating Market Sees Signs of Recovery
Russia's pleasure boat market is showing signs of recovery after a two-year lull. ... The most popular item is a modest-size family yacht or motorboat, priced anywhere from $30,000 to $500,000. ...
Maine Man Sentenced To 12 Years in Prison for Role in Meth Conspiracy
BOSTON - A Maine man has been sentenced for his role in a methamphetamine trafficking conspiracy that operated in M assachusetts, New Hampshire and Northern California.. Jacob Parlin, 44, of Lebanon, Maine, was sentenced by U.S. District Court Judge Leo T. Sorokin to 12 years in prison and five years of supervised release.
Search for missing Moscow rafter turns to recovery phase
RIGGINS -- The search for a Moscow man missing after a rafting accident Friday on the Salmon River near Riggins was being called a recovery effort Monday as authorities continued
Russia Yacht Charter
Russia Yacht Charter, Moscow, Russia. 120 likes. Организация отдыха, обучения на парусных яхтах. Семейные ...